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In today’s marketplace firms have to become specialized in specific
technological aspects in product development due to intensifying competition.
Further, the increasing complexity of offerings make firms become more de-
pendent on other value-chain contributors such as providers of complementary
and component technologies. Therefore, in addition to the inherent market
appeal of a product, a successful introduction may depend on the firm’s inter-
actions with suppliers and even "competitors". These interactions with other
firms in the marketplace present a unique set of challenges to firms. In this
dissertation, we explore how a firm’s approach to interacting with supply chain
partners and/or competitors may depend upon how its product provides value
to consumers.
In the first essay, we look into how a firm should design the interde-
pendence between a durable good and a consumable such as a printer and a
vii
cartridge and utilize the benefits of an industry of generic consumable sup-
pliers. In the second essay, we analyze the different approaches that firms
adopt while commercializing their technologies to competitors in a networked
environment (such as telecommunications). We identify the impact of the
competitor’s development capabilities on the trade-off between the increased
competition and network benefits. In the third essay, we explore situations
in which firms collaborate to develop a component innovation that they later
market individually; they codevelop and jointly market; and they choose to
individually develop and market. We consider how competitive strategies be-
tween development partners should consider the influence of supplier forma-
tion on the investment incentives of an OEM. In summary, this dissertation
examines how the management of interactions with supply chain partners and
competitors can play an important role in technology development and deploy-
ment. Our results highlight key trade-offs and provide insights for managers
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In today’s marketplace firms have to become specialized in specific
technological aspects in product development due to intensifying competition.
Further, the increasing complexity of offerings make firms become more de-
pendent on other value-chain contributors such as providers of complementary
and component technologies. Therefore, in addition to the inherent market
appeal of a product, a successful introduction may depend on the firm’s inter-
actions with suppliers and even "competitors". These interactions with other
firms in the marketplace present a unique set of challenges to firms.
In this dissertation, we explore how a firm’s approach to interacting
with supply chain partners and/or competitors may depend upon how its
product or innovation provides value to consumers. Specifically, we focus on
three strategic collaborative and competitive issues related to product design,
product development, technology development and deployment: the interde-
pendence between a durable good and a contingent consumable; the com-
mercialization of a component innovation in an environment that has network
externalities; and the formation of strategic development alliances among com-
petitors that supply a critical component to an original equipment manufac-
1
turer (OEM).
The manner in which the product provides value to the consumers can
change the strategy that the firm would consider against its competitors. In
chapter 2, we explore this issue further in the context of a durable good and a
contingent service or consumable. Many durable products provide value only
when used together with contingent services or consumables, such as print-
ers and ink, electronic products and batteries, automobiles and maintenance
and repair services. The interdependence between the durable good and the
consumable creates a stream of revenues for the durable good manufacturer
from the consumable sales over the lifetime of the durable good. In fact, many
manufacturers of such durable products have come to rely primarily upon the
revenues generated from the contingent services or consumables as the pri-
mary source of profitability. Therefore, the manufacturer’s decision to make
a durable good compatible with generic consumables becomes not only a de-
sign decision, but an important aspect of the manufacturer’s market strategy,
particularly when the potential entrants also compete with the manufacturer
in the consumable market. However, observation from practice suggests that
some manufacturers allow the use of generic components with their durable
goods, while some do not.
Therefore, to better understand the impact of the interdependence be-
tween a durable good and its contingent consumable on the manufacturer’s
product design, we examine the conditions under which it is beneficial for the
manufacturer to exploit the availability of generic substitutes for the consum-
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able by designing its product to be compatible with them. We identify situa-
tions in which the manufacturer should design its product to be incompatible
with generic consumables and other situations in which it would benefit from
designing its durable so that consumers could substitute other manufacturers’
consumables. We find that consumers’ willingness to pay increases by their
rational expectations of the future value of their durable good and the avail-
ability of more affordable consumables. Our results suggest that the provision
of a consumable by a third party may affect consumer expectations of future
prices of new and used durables and the manufacturer can benefit from the
presence of this third party competition.
Commercialization of a component innovation is also significantly de-
termined by the inter-firm relationships. When a firm develops an innovation
with respect to one particular component, other firms that posses different
capabilities in other components may be more or less able to exploit the inno-
vation than the innovator. In chapter 3, we specifically examine not only the
benefits of the increased network effects, but also the rival’s ability to inte-
grate the component technology with its own product. We focus our analysis
on industries that are characterized by modular product architectures, verti-
cally differentiated products and network effects. e.g. cellular phones, inter-
active software, media players, etc. First, we analyze the different approaches
that firms adopt while commercializing their technologies to competitors in a
networked environment. Next we identify the impact of the competitor’s de-
velopment capabilities on the trade-off between the increased competition and
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network benefits. Our results suggest that the innovator is generally more will-
ing to share (license or sell-out) her component technology with competitors
whose capability to develop other components for the product and integrate it
with the component technology are significantly different from her own abili-
ties. This interaction between component innovators and competitors offers a
potential explanation for why many technological firms engage in innovation
transfer despite the potential of dominating the market with their technology.
Firms seek ways of interacting with external partners and/or competi-
tors to best utilize their know-how and expertise. In particular, the strategic
alliances and joint ventures could improve a firm’s ability to influence the
decisions of other participants and non-participants in the collaboration and
hence, its profits. Without understanding the impact of the alliance formation
on the nature of the supply chain, firms may face profound consequences in
maximizing their profits. Therefore, in chapter 4 we explore how the structure
of one level of the supply chain affects other dimensions of channel operations
and the nature of the supply chain.
Specifically, we consider the formation of strategic development al-
liances among competitors that supply a critical component to an original
equipment manufacturer (OEM). We first consider a situation in which sup-
pliers would form a joint venture to develop and market the component. We
next consider how the outcome for the OEM and suppliers in a development
alliance would change if they codevelop the component, but compete in mar-
keting and sales to the OEM. And finally, we look into the situation where
4
the suppliers may choose not to form any alliance, and compete to develop
and market the component individually. In all of these situations we study
the tradeoff between the reduced profits due to competition and the demand
increase due to investment decisions of the OEM. The selection of supplier
formation gives rise to some important questions: How does the attractiveness
of an alliance play a role in affecting the OEM’s decision to invest in the de-
mand stimulating activities? Under what conditions is it more valuable for the
suppliers to compete rather than collaborate? To answer these questions, we
consider the strategic consequences of collaboration and competition that the
alliance between two upstream suppliers can impose upon the cost reducing
investments of a downstream manufacturer. Based on our analysis we iden-
tify the conditions under which it is beneficial for the suppliers to codevelop
and compete in sales. Our results explain the counter-intuitive behavior of
innovators with radical breakthroughs, who willingly create competition.
In subsequent chapters, we conceptualize and model these strategic is-
sues related to product design, product development and technology develop-
ment and deployment, and examine how competitive and collaborative forces
in a supply chain influence these decisions. Finally, we conclude with a dis-




Managing Revenue Streams for Durable
Products with Contingent Services or
Consumable Components
2.1. Introduction
Many products are sold in a bundle that includes a durable good and
a contingent consumable, such as printers and ink, electronic products and
batteries, automobiles and warranty services. However, in order for a consumer
to continue to derive value from the durable, he must continue to buy the
contingent1 consumable. This interdependence between the durable good and
the consumable creates a stream of revenues for the durable good manufacturer
over the life of the product. Over the entire life cycle of a durable, the stream
of revenues and profits from the consumables can often far exceed that from
the initial sale of the durable.
The printer and ink supply industry provides a good example. In 2004
Hewlett-Packard (HP) derived 73% of its profits from its printer division, but
more than 50% of the profits in the printer division came from the sales of
1As described in Peterson and Mahajan (1978), a contingency between two products
is a special case of complementarity that occurs when neither product can be used in the
absence of the other.
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ink and toner supplies (Business Week, 2005b). Naturally, the profitability of
the ink supply business has not gone unnoticed, and it has attracted many
fast-growing startups, such as Cartridge World.
However, not all manufacturers of printers responded to the entry of
generic ink suppliers in the same way. Lexmark initially made its printer
cartridge incompatible with any generic ink cartridges by installing a special
electronic chip that prevented consumers from using cartridges that were not
obtained directly from Lexmark. In contrast, although HP did not take any
initiative to interfere with consumers ability to use generic ink cartridges in
its printers, it instead focused on maintaining a perceived gap in quality be-
tween its ink and that of other manufacturers, both through its marketing and
through legal channels. For example, HP has threatened to litigate Cartridge
World for infringing on its patented ink formulations (Business Week, 2005a).
Consider another example from the electronic products industry. When
Apple first introduced its iPod, some consumers were horrified to discover that
the product was not designed to be opened up in order to replace the battery.
Once the original lithium-ion battery died, replacement required a fairly high
level of technical sophistication and ingenuity on the part of the consumer.
For most consumers, the life of their iPod was thereby limited to the life of
its battery. Subsequently, in response to environmental issues as well as the
entry of third-party firms offering iPod battery replacements, Apple set up its
own battery replacement program. However, Apple has not interfered with
the compatibility between the iPod and alternative battery kits, and even
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promotes these alternatives on its website.
In other durable goods industries, e.g. heavy equipment, automobiles,
etc., the maintenance and repair services that are required to keep a durable
product in good working order represent contingent consumables. In some
industries, the market for these is four or five times larger than the product
market (Bundschuh and Dezvane, 2003). Some manufacturers attempt to
prevent third-party service providers from gaining access to their consumers
by withholding technical specifications or specialized replacement parts, or by
requiring large investments in expensive diagnostic equipment as is common
in the automobile industry.
Motivated by these examples, we develop a model of monopolist man-
ufacturer of a durable product that requires a contingent consumable for con-
tinued use. The model includes the costs of producing the durable and the
consumable and the rate at which the performance of the durable deterio-
rates. We assume that there exists a competitive industry that supplies a
generic consumable that is a possible alternative to the branded one provided
by the durable goods manufacturer, and further assume that this generic sub-
stitute is of lower quality. By analyzing this model we identify conditions
under which the manufacturer should attempt to avoid competition with the
generic consumables, perhaps by making her product incompatible with them,
as well as conditions under which she should seek to exploit the availability of
generic substitutes for her own branded consumable.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we
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review the literature. Section 2.3 details our model. In Section 2.4 we first
analyze the optimal strategies for the incompatible consumable market and a
consumable market with generic consumables. We then compare the profits
that the manufacturer makes under both market structures. The final section
concludes the chapter. Throughout the chapter, we adopt the convention of
using masculine pronouns to refer to the manufacturer.
2.2. Literature Review
There are several distinct literatures to which our work relates. There
exists a large literature that addresses the conditions under which a firm can
benefit from compatibility with a rival. As discussed in Katz and Shapiro
(1994), compatibility can be an important issue either in settings in which
there are direct network effects, that allow consumers to benefit from being
able to interact with other consumers of compatible products, or in settings
in which products consist of sets of compatible components, e.g. video gam-
ing hardware and software, and increasing compatibility increases the choices
available to consumers. Although it has long been recognized that compatibil-
ity can be advantageous in settings in which there are direct network effects,
our work is more closely related to compatibility among components of prod-
uct systems. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) consider a setting in which two
firms offer products that are systems of two component types, and each firm
offers exactly one flavor of each of the component types. They demonstrate
that compatibility among the two firms’ components can be beneficial by al-
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lowing differentiated consumers to better match their preferences. Economides
(1989) extended this work by allowing for n firms and allowing for a more gen-
eral demand function. In a later work, Matutes and Regibeau (1992) allow for
firms to make their components compatible but to offer discounts to consumers
who purchase all of the components from one firm. They demonstrate that
although firms will offer these discounts in equilibrium, they would be better
off if they could commit to not doing so. Although we also focus on a prod-
uct that requires two compatible components, we include a time dimension in
which one of the components is durable, i.e. lasts for more than one period,
while the other is not.
Church and Gandal (2000) study a product system composed of a hard-
ware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends
on the availability of software. They show that the merger of a hardware
firm with a software firm can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hard-
ware market when the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with
a rival technology. Our paper demonstrates that a firm can benefit from low
end competition even in the absence of the network externalities. The generic
consumable industry extends the availability of the consumables to the con-
sumers with low valuations for the product bundle and increases the price the
consumers are willing to pay.
The problem that we study is closely related to the one considered
in the literature on remanufacturing. Implicitly, a remanufacturable product
involves a durable core as well as one or more consumable components that
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wear out sooner than the durable core and are critical to the operation of the
product. In this respect, remanufacturing has some similarity to the setting
that we study. Although much of the work in remanufacturing has focused on
logistical issues, there are several papers that address the competition between
the original manufacturer and remanufacturers, which is similar to the com-
petition between the firms to provide the service or consumable component
in our setting. Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) show how a rival remanu-
facturer can erode the profits of a monopolist manufacturer and discuss how
the manufacturer can deter the remanufacturer from entering. This work was
extended by Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006), who focus on the effect of reman-
ufacturability on the pricing strategies of a monopolist original manufacturer
with and without competition from a remanufacturer, and by Ferguson and
Toktay (2006), who focus on strategies for deterring the entry of a remanufac-
turer. Debo et al. (2005) endogenizes the manufacturer’s remanufacturability
decision and shows how the joint pricing-remanufacturability decision is af-
fected by a rival remanufacturer. This work was extended in the context of
a diffusion of technology model, but ignoring the possibility of competition,
in Debo et al. (2006). In all of these papers, it is assumed that the durable
cores are disposed of by consumers who consume them with either new or
remanufactured units, and it is up to either the original manufacturer or a re-
manufacturer to collect the cores and convert them into marketable products.
Relatively little attention has been paid to the potential for these durable cores
to have value to consumers, either for their market resale value or their abil-
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ity to provide additional usefulness. Two notable exceptions are Guide et al.
(2003), who analyze the optimal prices that a remanufacturer should pay for
acquiring cores of varying levels of quality, and Ray et al. (2005) who consider
various trade-in allowances that a monopolist can offer when it sells to both
new consumers and those wanting to replace a unit that they currently own.
However, neither of these papers allows for consumers’ willingness to pay to
be influenced by their rational expectations of the future value of their durable
core.
In addition to the literatures on component commonality and remanu-
facturing, there are several papers that have addressed the provision of service
after the sale of a durable product. The work of Cohen and Whang (1997)
has perhaps the most similarity to our own. They also study the effect of
competition to provide the contingent consumable2 for a durable product and
examine how it affects the level of quality and the pricing decisions for the
manufacturer. More recent papers, e.g. Kim et al. (2007a), Bhattacharya
et al. (2006) and Kim et al. (2007b), consider methods of contracting for these
after sales services. However, none of these papers consider how the provision
of service by a third party may affect consumer expectations of future prices
of new and used durables nor whether the manufacturer can benefit from the
presence of this third party competition.
2They specifically refer to the contingent consumable as service.
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2.3. Model
We consider a situation in which a manufacturer produces a durable
good that provides value to the consumer only when used together with a con-
tingent non-durable consumable. A new product in our setting is the bundle
of a durable good and a branded consumable, and we assume that a brand
new durable good is not sold separately. However, the durable good lasts for
two periods with some depreciation in its value, so there are available used
durable goods that could be obtained separately. Each period in our model
corresponds to a period of use of the consumable by a consumer, after which
a new consumable has to be purchased. To receive some positive utility from
a used durable good in any period, consumers must own a consumable, which
is used in combination with the durable good. Alternatively, they may buy a
new product or not use it at all.
Therefore, there are two potential parts in the revenue stream of the
manufacturer: sale of new product bundles and sale of consumables. The man-
ufacturer could be the sole supplier of the consumables by keeping his durable
good incompatible with industry standard consumable brands. Alternatively,
he could design his durable good compatible with identical generic consum-
ables, provided by a competitive consumable industry.3 Therefore, the variety
3There could be practical issues associated with compatibility such as sacrifice of quality
to design the durable good compatible. In our model, we exclude such practical issues and
assume that the manufacturer’s design decision does not reduce the quality of its durable
good or consumable. For example, HP does not necessarily change the design of its cartridge
to be compatible with generic ink, but an HP cartridge accommodates generic ink as well
as HP branded ink, as it is now.
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of available consumables depend on the compatibility decision of the manufac-
turer. For example, the battery of the first generation iPod nano is soldered
to the main board and in the design of fifth generation iPods the battery is
attached to a metal plate. The battery is not designed to be replaced by the
user. On the other hand, Apple’s design does not limit the battery replace-
ment exclusive to Apple’s battery replacement program. The iPod design also
allows third-party companies to offer cheaper battery replacement kits with
higher capacity batteries. The assumption of the competitive consumable in-
dustry is critical to our model since the price competition generates positive
value for a bundle of a used durable good and a consumable.
In our model, to capture the depreciation of the durable good, we as-
sume that the brand new durable good has quality sd = 1 and the used durable
good has quality sd2 ≤ sd in the following period. It is plausible to expect that
the manufacturer’s consumable would have higher perceived quality because
of superior integration of the branded consumable with his own durable good,
his brand reputation, etc. Thus, we assume that the branded consumable
made by the manufacturer has quality sB = 1, whereas the generic consum-
able produced by a consumable industry has quality sG, which is lower than
sB, sG < sB = 1. And due to the interdependence between the durable good
and the contingent consumable, the marginal benefit of increasing the quality
of the consumable sj is increasing in the quality of the durable good si and vice
versa, so we assume that the overall quality of the product is sisj. There is no
value in having only a durable good or a consumable alone. If one component
14
is missing, the overall quality is simply zero.
We assume that the marginal cost of production for the durable good
cd and the branded consumable cB are constant. In addition, the competition
in the generic consumable industry drives the retail price, pG, down to the
marginal production cost. Besides the compatibility decision, the production
costs would dictate whether a consumable manufacturer could enter the con-
sumable market or not. In order to enter, the generic industry has to be more
efficient at producing consumables, i.e. it needs to have a higher quality-to-
cost relative to the manufacturer (pG < cBsG). Further, we assume that the
used durable goods can be bought and sold among consumers in a second-hand
market with no transaction costs.
In each period, each consumer either uses one durable and one con-
sumable or uses no product. They differ in their valuation for product quality,
which consists of the quality of the durable good and the consumable. Their
valuation v for product quality is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
We refer to a consumer with valuation v as a consumer of type v. A product of
quality s provides an intrinsic value of vs for a customer of type v. Therefore,
the utility for a product bundle of a durable good of quality si and a consum-
able of quality sj is given by U (v, si, sj) = vsisj. A consumer of valuation v
has a total valuation of vsdsB = v from having a new product bundle. In the
following period, the consumer has valuation vsd2sB = vsd2 if he has a used
durable good with a branded consumable; and valuation vsd2sG if he owns a
used durable good with a generic consumable. This model of valuation with
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the assumption of zero transaction costs insures that a consumer of any given
valuation v who has a new durable good has higher utility for the branded con-
sumable than he would if he had the used durable good and also, a consumer
with a branded consumable has higher utility than he would with a generic
consumable (sdsB ≥ sd2sB ≥ sd2sG).
2.3.1 Formulation of the Manufacturer’s Optimization Problem
Since the technological life of the durable good is long relative to the
physical durability of the consumable, we develop a discrete-time, infinite-
horizon optimization problem for the manufacturer. We use superscript t to
label periods.
In this game the manufacturer decides on the quantities of new product
bundles and the consumables at the beginning of each period. The manufac-
turer’s quantity vector in each period is stated as qt = (qt−1n , qtn, qtB), where
he would produce a quantity qtn of new product bundles and a quantity qtB
of the branded consumables at period t. If the durable good is compatible,
the generic consumable industry would produce a quantity qtG of the generic
consumables. Let N, B, G and O represent consumer actions corresponding to
purchasing a new product, a branded consumable, a generic consumable, and
not buying anything, respectively. Each consumer chooses an action strategi-
cally, depending on the consumer’s action in the past period, the current action
and the manufacturer’s current quantity vector. We represent the action of a
consumer of type v at time t, at (v). We repeat this game forever and model
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the decision making process of the manufacturer as a steady state profit max-
imization problem. We require equilibrium of our model to be perfect in every
period. However, we focus on any perfect equilibrium which depends only on
the payoff relevant history. Therefore, we take the standard Markov perfect
equilibrium approach to solve the optimization problem similar to Maskin and
Tirole (1988) and Huang et al. (2001).
Before we describe the dynamic game and the steady state optimiza-
tion in detail, we characterize the consumer behaviors. When different types
of consumables are available, each consumer purchases the product mix that
maximizes his or her payoff and the market is segmented according to the con-
sumer valuations. Here we construct the model for the case when both types
of consumables would be available and consumers with a separate consumable
need to purchase a used durable good. It is straightforward to apply this model
to other situations in which only one type of consumable or no consumable is
available.
Based on the model of consumer valuation, let vn represent the valua-
tion of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying a new product
and a consumable, and let vb denote the valuation of the marginal consumer
who is indifferent between buying a branded and a generic consumable. Fur-
ther, vc represents the valuation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent
between buying a generic consumable and nothing. All consumers with val-
uations in [vb, vn) and [vc, vb) purchase a branded consumable and a generic
consumable, respectively, while consumers with valuations in [vn, 1] purchase
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a new durable good from the manufacturer. Consumers with valuations in
[0, vc) purchase nothing. This market segmentation is seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Market Segmentation for Consumers with different valuations.
The marginal consumers with valuations at vn, vb and vc can obtain
the same payoff from either purchasing choices that they are indifferent and
would have the following incentive compatibility constraints, respectively,




= vnsd2 − ptB − ptu (2.1)
vbsd2 − ptB − ptu = vbsd2sG − pG − ptu (2.2)
vcsd2sG − pG − ptu = 0 (2.3)
where ptn, ptB and ptu denote the prices of new product bundles, consumables
and used durable goods at period t, respectively. The new product owners an-
ticipate a sales price for their durable goods in the subsequent period, denoted
by E [pt+1u ] with a discount factor of δ. Recall that sd = sB = 1.
As Figure 2.1 shows, since at period t the manufacturer produces a
quantity qtn of new product bundles, the marginal consumer of type vn, who
is indifferent between buying a new product and a consumable, will have a
valuation of 1 − qtn, i.e. vn = 1 − qtn. Similarly, we can express the marginal
18
consumer valuations in terms of quantities as vb = 1 − qtn − qtB and vc =
1− qtn − qt−1n . Writing the valuations in (2.1)-(2.3) in terms of quantities and
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Since the generic consumable industry produces at its marginal cost, the man-
ufacturer has the market power to control the prices, which are determined by
the manufacturer’s decisions on the production quantities.
Now we can characterize the payoff function for a consumer of type v.
The payoff at period t depends on the consumer’s action in the past period,
the current action and the current quantity vector, i.e. gtv (at−1 (v) , at (v) , qt).
If the consumer has no used durable goods, i.e. at−1 (v) ∈ N = {B, G, O},
the payoff function becomes,
gtv
(




v − ptn (qt) + δE [pt+1u (qt)] if at (v) = N
vsd2 − ptB (qt)− ptu (qt) if at (v) = B
vsd2sG − pG − ptu (qt) if at (v) = G
0 if at (v) = O
where δ represents the discount factor. When the consumer has a used durable
good, the price functions in (2.4)-(2.6) will not change and the payoff function
for any consumer of type v becomes gtv (N, at (v) , qt) = gtv
(




t). Hence, the ownership of a used durable good improves the consumer
payoffs with the same amount under each action.
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To understand the steady-state behaviors of the manufacturer and the
consumers, we construct the Bellman equations for a consumer of type v and
the manufacturer. We first establish the consumer’s Bellman equation with
the value function Dtv (at−1 (v) , qt) as
Dtv
(











at (v) , qt+1
)}
(2.7)
with a discount factor of δ. Given his previous action at−1 (v), the optimal
action vector of (2.7), at (v)∗, determines the reaction function of the consumer
of type v to the quantity vector qt,
Rtv
[
at−1 (v) , qt
]
= at (v)∗ (2.8)
Note that the relative preference among actions N, B, G and O is indepen-
dent of whether the consumer owns a durable good from the previous period.
Therefore, the reaction function would depend only upon qt and consumers
would make the same preferences as long as qt is constant. As a result, at each
period of the steady state a consumer chooses the same consumption strategy,
i.e. at (v)∗ is constant. Therefore, Rtv [qt] = at (v)
∗.
Now we can formulate the Bellman equation for the manufacturer with
the value function M t (qt), the reward function πt (qt) = qtn (ptn − cd − cB) +
qtB (p
t

























Since there is no second-hand market for the consumables and no hidden in-
formation, there will never be excess consumable production at the steady
state. The consumable demand in any given period t, however, is constrained
by a supply constraint, the number of available used products that are gen-
erated by the sales of new product bundles at the previous period t − 1, i.e.
qtB ≤ qt−1n . Solving the manufacturer’s Bellman equation, we compute the
optimal quantities qt∗n and qt∗B .
In the steady limit, the manufacturer’s decisions and consumer strate-
gies are constant in time, so we eliminate the time dependence from all of the
equations. Hence, the optimization problem for the manufacturer becomes
static. The profit maximization problem of the manufacturer is reduced to
a generic period problem. In a generic period the manufacturer would pro-
duce a quantity qn of new product bundles and a quantity qB of the branded
consumables to maximize his total profit π,
π (qn, qB) = qn (pn − cd − cB) + qB (pB − cB) (2.10)
subject to qB ≤ qn (2.11)
qn, qB ≥ 0
where pn and pB denote the prices of new product bundles and consumables,
as shown in (2.4) and (2.5), respectively.
Next we determine the conditions on the equilibrium path and char-
acterize how the manufacturer’s decisions lead to the steady state quantities.
The initial conditions at t = 0 are that q0B = q0G = 0 since there are no initial
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used durable goods. Using backward induction, it is possible to show that the
game converges to a focal point of (qt∗n , qt∗B ) for all values of t in the strategy
space beginning from an initial state in a finite horizon game (Maskin and Ti-
role, 1988; Huang et al., 2001). We can show that the manufacturer uses the
same production strategy in every period after Period 1. Period 2, without loss
of generality, is the first of an infinite stream of identical periods. In general,
if the equilibrium is to depend only on the payoff relevant history, the produc-
tion quantity vector at time t − 1, q(t−1)∗, will be equal to qt∗ at the steady
state. The optimal quantities for new product bundles and consumables also













. The manufacturer would always
produce his optimal quantity (qt∗n , qt∗B ) at the steady state. This method is
illustrated in Appendix.
It is straightforward to apply this approach to other two possible situ-
ations with different preferences. When the consumable market is proprietary
to the manufacturer’s product, the market is segmented according to consumer
preferences N , B and O. And when the consumables are supplied only by the
generic industry, the consumers prefer to choose among N , G and O. The
discussion for the steady state holds similarly for each case. In Section 4.4,
we analyze each of these possible cases at the steady state. In order to keep
our expositions clear in discussing the presence of the generic consumables, we
present our results with the additional assumption that δ = 1 in the rest of
the chapter. This assumption has limited bearing on our results for the steady
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state and no significant insights are lost.
2.4. Analysis and Results
In this section, we examine under what conditions the generic con-
sumable industry influences the manufacturer’s design decision on the com-
patibility of his durable good with other generic consumables. We solve the
manufacturer’s optimization problem at the steady state and we will not have
any time dependence in our analysis. We are particularly interested in the in-
dustry structure depending on the costs of production of the durable and the
contingent consumable, the rate of deterioration of the durable good and the
quality of his own branded consumable relative to that of the generic substi-
tutes. In Section 2.4.1, we examine a situation where the manufacturer designs
the durable good compatible only with his proprietary consumable. Later in
Section 2.4.2, we study another situation when the durable good is compatible
with generic consumables produced by a competitive industry with a higher
quality-to-cost ratio. In Section 2.4.3, we compare our findings and derive the
optimal design strategies for the original manufacturer.
2.4.1 Incompatible Consumables
As a benchmark, we first consider a situation where the manufacturer
focuses on incompatibility by not making his durable good compatible with
any generic consumables. Let vn represent the marginal consumer who is in-
different between buying a new product and a branded consumable to use with
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a used durable good. Similarly, let vb represent the marginal consumer who
is indifferent between purchasing a branded consumable and nothing. Thus,
all consumers with valuations in [vb, vn) purchase a used durable good and a
consumable while consumers with valuations in [vn, 1] buy a product bundle
of a new durable good and a consumable from the manufacturer. Consumers
with valuations in [0, vb) purchase nothing. In addition, the valuations of the
marginal consumers in terms of manufacturer’s quantities are vn = 1 − qn
and vb = 1 − qB − qn, respectively. Furthermore, the limited supply for the
used durable goods could generate a positive value of pu when all used durable
goods are purchased with a consumable. We do not explicitly compute the
value of pu since the manufacturer controls both markets and can get this ad-
ditional value by charging a higher price for the new product bundles pn or
the consumables pB.
In order to find the price functions, we first solve the incentive compat-
ibility constraint of the marginal consumer with valuation vb,
(1− qB − qn) sd2 − pB = 0
we can easily find the price for the branded consumable as
pB (qn, qB) = (1− qn − qB) sd2 (2.12)
Then, the incentive compatibility of the marginal consumer who is indifferent
between buying a product and a branded consumable is given as
(1− qn)− pn = (1− qn) sd2 − (1− qn − qB) sd2
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and we can find the retail price for the durable product,
pn (qn, qB) = 1− qn − qBsd2 (2.13)
The manufacturer’s optimization function in (2.10) can be solved insert-
ing pB in (2.12) and pn in (2.13) subject to a specific constraint in (2.11) that
defines the manufacturer’s optimal strategy. In Proposition 2.4.1 below, we
summarize optimal design strategies when the manufacturer keeps the durable
good of his product compatible only with his own consumable.
Proposition 2.4.1. Incompatible consumables market
When the manufacturer does not make his durable good compatible with any
generic brand consumable, the manufacturer’s optimal production strategy in
the steady limit can be characterized according to three thresholds, cd1 = cB(1−sd2)sd2
≤ cd2 = (cB+sd2)(1−sd2)2sd2 ≤ cd0 = 1− 2cB + sd2. At each period,
a) If cd1 < cd ≤ cd2, the manufacturer produces more new product bundles than
consumables.
b) If cd ≤ cd1, the manufacturer only produces new product bundles.
c) If cd2 < cd ≤ cd0, the manufacturer produces as many new product bundles
as consumables.
d) If cd > cd0, the manufacturer does not produce anything.
Proof. When the manufacturer produces a higher quantity of new product
bundles than the quantity of the consumables in each period, there would be
no positive value for the used durable good, i.e. pu = 0 at the steady state.
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In such case when the constraint (2.11) becomes qn > qB > 0, solving for the









If cd1 < cd ≤ cd2, q∗n > q∗B > 0 and the equilibrium quantities are the optimal
quantities.
When the production cost is low (cd ≤ cd1), the manufacturer would
only produce all new product bundles. The marginal consumer of type vn0
who is indifferent between purchasing a new product and nothing would have
the valuation of vn0 = 1− qn. The consumers with valuations [vn0, 1] purchase
a new product bundle. Maximizing the manufacturer’s profit function in (2.10)




, which is optimal if cd ≤ cd1.
On the other hand, if cd > cd2, by substituting qn = qB in (2.11)
and solving the first order conditions of (2.10), the manufacturer’s first order




1− 2cB − cd + sd2
2 (1 + 3sd2)
(2.15)
And the manufacturer produces as many new product bundles as consumables.
Alternatively, the manufacturer would produce nothing when cd > cd0.
The optimal profits of the incompatible consumable market under dif-




B) = max {π (q∗n, q∗B) , π (q∗∗n , q∗∗B ) , π (q∗∗∗n , 0)} for cd1 < cd ≤ cd2;
π (q∗∗n , q
∗∗
B ) = max {π (q∗n, q∗B) , π (q∗∗n , q∗∗B ) , π (q∗∗∗n , 0)} for cd2 < cd ≤ cd0;
and π (q∗∗n , q∗∗B ) ≤ π (q∗∗∗n , 0) < 0, when cd > cd0.
Market Structure The Manufacturer’s Profits
























qn > qB = 0 π (q
∗∗∗
n , 0) =
1
4
(1− cB − cd)2
Table 2.1: The Manufacturer’s Profits when no generic consumable is compat-
ible.
Proposition 2.4.1 shows that the manufacturer finds it optimal to of-
fer only new product bundles at each period and does not produce any con-
sumables separately when he produces the durable good at a relatively low
cost (cd ≤ cd1) or with a high deterioration rate. When the quality of the
deteriorated units, sd2, is equal to the ratio of the consumable costs to over-
all costs, cB
cB+cd
, the manufacturer is indifferent between having a consum-
able and not having one. Otherwise, he is strictly better off having one
(π (q∗n, q
∗
B) > π (q
∗∗∗
n , 0)) when sd2 >
cB
cB+cd
, i.e. cd > cd1. Since a product
is a bundle of a durable good and a contingent consumable, a high produc-
tion cost of the consumable increases the overall cost of the product and for
high cB, the sales margin on the consumables is less than on the new prod-
uct bundles. Further, the manufacturer’s production of consumables offers an
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alternative to the consumers and reduces the demand for its new product bun-
dle. Therefore, he offers all new product bundles and generates higher sales
profit. However, he is less inclined to follow this strategy as the production
cost of the consumables goes down (cB ↓) and thereby, the sales margin on
the consumables increases. As a result, the manufacturer starts producing
separate consumables. This is displayed as an increasing threshold of the cost
of the durable goods, cd1, with cB.
As it gets costlier to make the durable goods (cd ↑), the sales margin on
the new product bundles drops whereas the sales margin on the consumables
does not change. The manufacturer’s production quantity of the consumables
increases with cd while he produces fewer new product bundles. Because the
demand for consumables is constrained by the availability of the durable goods,
he could offer as many consumables as there are available used durable goods
above a certain production cost of the durable good, cd2. Nevertheless, when
it is too costly to produce a durable good (cd > cd0), then the manufacturer
would not find it profitable to enter the product market.
Further, the quality of the used durable good influences the incompat-
ible manufacturer’s optimal production strategy.
Corollary 2.4.2. Quality of the Used Durable Good
i) cd0 increases; cd2 and cd1 decreases with sd2. That is, an increase in the
quality of the used durable good increases the motivation of the manufacturer
to offer as many new product bundles as consumables at each period.
ii) If the used durable good does not deteriorate (sd2 = 1), the manufacturer
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would only produce the same amount of new product bundles and consumables
at each period.
The proof to Corollary 2.4.2 is straightforward from the first derivatives
of the thresholds with respect to sd2. When the durable good deteriorates
significantly, the branded consumable serves to differentiate the market as the
consumers with low valuations prefer the more affordable consumable than
the new product bundle. If the manufacturer could produce a durable good
which deteriorates less over time, an increase in sd2 would generate a reduction
in the quality gap between a bundle of used durable good and consumable
and a new product bundle. This increase in the quality of the used durable
good creates some positive value and therefore, consumers are willing to pay a
higher price for a higher quality durable good. The manufacturer could obtain
this positive value of the used durable good by increasing its product price.
Further, the branded consumable production reduces the manufacturer’s cost
of delivering the product to the market. Therefore, an increase in the quality
of the used durable good influences the manufacturer to limit the quantity
of the new product bundles to the quantity of consumables and expand the
region bounded by cd2 < cd ≤ cd0. When the quality gap between a used
and a new durable good diminishes, the manufacturer would only consider
offering the same quantity of consumables and new product bundles because
the differentiation between a used and a new durable good vanishes and it is
cheaper to produce the consumables.
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To further understand the conditions that determine the optimal strat-
egy, we consider a numerical example. Suppose the manufacturer’s product
deteriorates with sd2 = 0.5. Figure 2.2.a shows the cost parameters (cB, cd) for
which incompatible consumable market (I), constrained incompatible consum-
able market (Ic) and no consumable market (N) with sales of all new product
bundles are optimal strategies for the manufacturer if he does not permit any
entry in the consumable market. In Corollary 2.4.2 above, we have shown
that a higher quality used durable good creates a shift in the manufacturer’s
decision to consider selling as many new product bundles as consumables for a
wider range of cost parameters. This result is illustrated in Figure 2.2.b, e.g.
sd2 = 0.85. The region “Ic” gets larger whereas the regions “I” and “N” shrink




Figure 2.2: Optimal Strategies for the Incompatible Manufacturer
(a) sd2 = 0.5, (b) sd2 = 0.85
2.4.2 Compatible Competitive Consumables
In this section, we consider what happens when the manufacturer makes
his product compatible with a competitive consumable industry which pro-
duces identical generic consumables and explore the conditions under which
the presence of a generic consumable industry could be beneficial for the man-
ufacturer. We first study the consumable market where the manufacturer
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produces branded consumables, which compete with the generic consumables.
Later we analyze a market where only generic consumables would be available.
We do not consider the manufacturer profits of an incompatible consumable
market derived in the previous section. We leave this comparative discussion
to § 2.4.3.
Let qG denote the quantity of the generic consumables in the steady
state. If the manufacturer decides on the product quantity qn such that there
would be no abundant number of used durable goods in the steady state
(qn = qB + qG or qn = qG), the market price for the used durable good would
be positive, i.e. pu > 0. Therefore, pu is dependent on qn.
First consider the situation where both types of consumables would be
available. Let vn represent the valuation of the marginal consumer who is in-
different between buying a new product and a consumable, and let vb denote
the valuation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying a
branded and a generic consumable. Further, vc represents the valuation of the
marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying a generic consumable
and nothing. All consumers with valuations in [vb, vn) and [vc, vb) purchase a
branded consumable and a generic consumable, respectively, while consumers
with valuations in [vn, 1] purchase a new product bundle from the manufac-
turer. Consumers with valuations in [0, vc) purchase nothing.
Setting the incentive compatibility constraints of the marginal con-
sumers with valuations vn = 1 − qn, vb = 1 − qn − qB and vc = 1 − 2qn,
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respectively,
(1− qn)− pn + pu = (1− qn) sd2 − pB − pu (2.16)
(1− qn − qB) sd2 − pB − pu = (1− qn − qB) sd2sG − pG − pu (2.17)
(1− 2qn) sd2sG − pG − pu = 0 (2.18)
and solving the set of equations in (2.16)-(2.18) simultaneously, we can find
the prices as
pn (qn, qB) = 1− qn − sd2qB + sd2sG (1 + qB − 3qn) (2.19)
pB (qn, qB) = pG + (1− qB − qn) (1− sG) sd2 (2.20)
pu (qn, qB) = (1− 2qn) sd2sG − pG (2.21)
Alternatively, we look into a situation where the consumable market is
solely served by the generic consumable industry. All consumers with valua-
tions in [vc, vn) either keep their durable good or purchase a used one besides
a generic consumable while consumers with valuations in [vn, 1] purchase a
brand new durable good from the manufacturer. Consumers with valuations
in [0, vc) purchase nothing. Similar to the analysis above, the incentive com-
patibility constraints for the marginal consumers at vn and vc are
1− qn − pn + pu = (1− qn) sd2sG − pG − pu (2.22)
(1− 2qn) sd2sG − pG − pu = 0 (2.23)
From the set of equations in (2.22) and (2.23), we find the price for the new
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product bundle as
pn = 1− qn − sd2qB + sd2sG (1 + qB − 3qn)− pG (2.24)
pu = (1− 2qn) sd2sG − pG (2.25)
The manufacturer’s optimal strategy can be found solving the optimiza-
tion function in (2.10) with respect to the corresponding set of price functions
and quantity constraint (2.11). In Proposition 2.4.3, we summarize the opti-
mal market strategies for the manufacturer when he allows the entry of generic
consumable manufacturers. The subscripts G and B0 denote the thresholds
where a consumable market with generic substitutes and with no branded
consumables become available, respectively.
Proposition 2.4.3. Compatible consumables market
When the manufacturer makes his durable good compatible with a generic
brand, the manufacturer’s market strategies can be characterized according




a) If cdB0 < cd < cdG, the manufacturer stays in the market while there is a
generic consumables industry as an alternative consumable supplier.
b) If 0 < cd ≤ min {cdB0, 1− 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG)} , the manufacturer produces
only new product bundles and leaves the consumable market.
c) Further, if cd ≥ 1− 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG), the manufacturer does not produce
any new product bundles.
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Proof. Using pn in (2.19) and pB in (2.20), and evaluating the first order
conditions of (2.10) subject to qn > qB in (2.11), the quantities that satisfy
the first order conditions, qFOCn and qFOCB , can be found as
qFOCn =
1− cd − 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG)






1− 2 (cB − pG)
sd2 (1− sG)
− 1− 2cd − 4pG − sd2
1− sd2 (1− 4sG)
)
(2.27)
where the superscript FOC denotes the first order condition for the case where





when cd > cdB0. And the manufacturer would shut out the generic consumable
industry when qFOCn = qFOCB , which means that cd > cdG. Therefore, for
cdB0 < cd < cdG, qFOCn and qFOCB are the optimal quantities when qn = qB +qG.
Similar to the previous case, when qn = qG, we can compute the equi-
librium product quantity qFOC2n of (2.10) with price functions in (2.24) and
(2.25) as
qFOC2n =
1− (cB + cd + pG) + sd2sG
2 (1 + 3sd2sG)
(2.28)
where the superscript FOC2 represents the first order condition. When cd ≥
1− 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG), qFOC2n is the optimal quantity for the manufacturer.
Lastly, we can find that for cd ≥ 1 − 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG), the man-





> 0. The profits are summarized in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: The Manufacturer’s Profits when generic consumables are compat-
ible.
Whether the manufacturer allows a generic consumable industry and
stays in the consumable market depends on the differentiation of the products
and competition. When the products are sufficiently differentiated and the
production costs are not very high (cdB0 < cd < cdG), he serves the high-end
consumers with high valuation for the product bundle. As his production costs
are increasing, the manufacturer gets hurt from a generic consumable industry
if he stays in the market. However, if the manufacturer with a high production
cost (cd > cdB0) leaves the market to the generic manufacturers, he could still
collect the positive value generated by the used durable goods by setting a
higher retail price for the new product bundles. In addition, the availability of
the generic consumables increases the demand for used durable goods, which in
return, increases the price of the product and his profits. Nonetheless, due to
extremely high durable good production costs (cd ≥ 1− 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG)),
he does not find it profitable to enter any of the markets.
We also find that by making its durable good compatible with the
generic substitutes, the manufacturer starts producing branded consumables
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where he was not producing if he had proprietary consumables (cd < cd1). Fur-
ther, he reduces his production of consumables for higher costs (cd1 < cd < cd0).
The availability of the cheaper alternative generated by the generic consumable
industry induces the consumers to consider a higher price for the used durable
good, which the manufacturer could obtain by his control on the market.
Therefore, the profitability of having a generic consumable industry
depends on the industry characteristics.
Corollary 2.4.4. Impact of Efficient Generic Consumable Industry
The range of parameters under which the equilibrium with a generic consum-
able industry exists expands as the industry becomes more efficient at making
the consumable, i.e. the generic consumables manufacturers possess a high
quality-to-cost ratio relative to the manufacturer.
Proof. We can compute the point cpB = pG + sd2 (1− sG) and c
p
d = 1− 2pG −
sd2 (1− 2sG) as the intersection point of thresholds cdB0 and cdG. As pG or sd2
drops, cpB also decreases and c
p
d increases. Similarly, an increase in sG leads to
decrease in cpB and an increase in c
p
d.
When the generic consumable industry produces a higher quality con-
sumable or reduces its production cost, the substitutes become more attractive
to the consumers. Since the manufacturer can obtain this additional value with
a high priced new product bundle, the manufacturer’s motivation to consider a
generic consumable industry increases. Furthermore, when the manufacturer’s
durable good deteriorates at a high rate, consumers would be less interested
37
in purchasing a consumable due to the interdependence between the durable
good and the consumable. However, an industry that could offer a higher
quality or more affordable alternative could influence this interdependence
and increase the appeal to the manufacturer’s product for a low quality used
durable good. As a result, the manufacturer is more willing to accommodate a
generic industry with high efficiency in consumable production. Later in Sec-
tion 2.4.3, we discuss how the manufacturer’s optimal decision is influenced
with the variations in making the components.
As a numerical example, consider the same manufacturer in Section
2.4.1 whose product deteriorates with sd2 = 0.85, who is faced with a generic
industry with sG = 0.5 and pG = 0.2. Figure 2.3 shows the cost param-
eters (cB, cd) for which competitive consumable market with both branded
and generic consumables (GB) and competitive consumable market with only
generic consumables (G) are feasible strategies for the manufacturer. The
dashed lines in the figure represent the manufacturer’s decisions in the incom-
patible consumable market. In the following section, we compare the profits
in both market structures.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Strategies for a Compatible Manufacturer when sd2 =
0.85, sG = 0.5, pG = 0.2.
2.4.3 Optimal Design Strategy
In order to find the optimal design strategy for the manufacturer we
challenge the incompatible market with a generic consumable industry. We
consider several numerical examples in order to assess the benefit of a generic
competitive industry to the manufacturer as well as to explore the sensitivity
of the optimal design strategies with respect to the model parameters. In
all of the cases, cB < sd2 and cB + cd < 1 hold to produce some branded
consumable and new product bundles, respectively; and pG < sd2sG is satisfied
for consumers to derive positive value from a generic consumable.
First, we consider a situation where the durable goods manufacturer
and the generic consumable manufacturers are close in production efficiency.
Particularly, we compare the case that the manufacturer could serve the whole
market with his consumable (qn = qB) if he kept his durable good design com-
patible only with his own consumable to the case when he allows the entry of
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generic consumable manufacturers.
Proposition 2.4.5. Manufacturer’s Compatibility Decision
When max {cd2, cdB0} < cd < min {1− 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG) , cdG}, the manu-
facturer designs his durable good compatible with the generic consumable in-
dustry.







the generic consumables would cannibalize some demand for the manufac-
turer’s consumable product, they also differentiate the market for the durable
good. The manufacturer, therefore, welcomes such entry and stays in the con-
sumable market as long as they offer sufficiently differentiated consumables.
Moreover, the manufacturer could always receive the positive value of the used
durable good by adjusting its sales price for the new product bundle.
Next, we examine a numerical example where we compare the profits
of the incompatible and competitive market structures with respect to the
model parameters. We will look closely into the results of one specific in-
stance (sd2 = 0.85, sG = 0.5, pG = 0.2) and compare the profit functions for
the manufacturer derived in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. Figure 2.4 demonstrates
our results for the specific parameter values. Similar results can be easily
derived for other values of sd2, sG and pG.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal Design Strategies for the Manufacturer when sd2 =
0.85, sG = 0.5, pG = 0.2
We discussed in Section 2.4.1 how the manufacturer’s decision to create
a consumable market is influenced by the production costs, cd and cB, and the
deterioration rate. As seen in Figure 2.4, we can suggest when it becomes
profitable to have a generic consumable industry.
Observation 1. When the generic consumable industry has a higher efficiency
in consumable production process relative to the manufacturer (sGcB > pG),
the manufacturer allows a competitive generic consumable market by making
his product compatible.
When the generic consumables industry has a higher efficiency at mak-
ing the consumables, i.e. the industry could provide a generic consumable at
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a higher quality-to-cost ratio relative to the manufacturer (sGcB > pG), the
manufacturer would allow the entry of the industry depending also on the
production cost of his durable good. For low values of cd, a cheaper alterna-
tive generic consumable improves the manufacturer’s earnings when it becomes
costlier to produce the branded consumable. This can be seen in the transition
between regions of incompatible {I, N} and compatible {GB, G} strategies
in Figure 2.4.
In the incompatible market as the durable good production gets costlier
for the manufacturer (cd > cd0), he ceases to produce any new product bun-
dles, as shown in Proposition 2.4.1. This production strategy changes when
an alternative generic consumable becomes available.
Observation 2. The presence of a generic consumable industry with a more
efficient production process relative to the manufacturer induces the manufac-
turer to produce new product bundles at high production costs, otherwise, the
manufacturer would not consider serving the market.
We can prove this observation easily. When the generic industry has
a higher quality-to-cost ratio, the production characteristics of the generic
consumable industry creates additional value for the manufacturer than with
the branded consumable, i.e. sd2sG − pG > sd2 − cB. This condition fur-
ther proves that cd0 ≤ cd < 1 − 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG) for such parameter val-
ues. Furthermore, when each durable good has a very high production cost
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(cd > 1− 2pG − sd2 (1− 2sG)), the manufacturer does not even enter the prod-
uct market despite a low cost generic consumable alternative.
It is straightforward to derive similar results for various efficiency levels
of the generic consumables industry. Our findings do not change, but the man-
ufacturer’s decision to accommodate the generic consumable industry depends
on the efficiency levels of the industry. When the generic consumable manu-
facturers increase their efficiency (sG ↑, pG ↓), we find that the manufacturer
is more willing to accommodate the generic consumable industry. Similarly,
a drop in efficiency (sG ↓, pG ↑) makes the generic consumables a less attrac-
tive option to the manufacturer. In addition, the manufacturer’s durable good
quality influences the efficiency of the industry due to dependency between
the durable good and consumable. To illustrate this, Figure 2.5 presents an
example of a more efficient industry relative to the example in Figure 2.4
(sd2 = 0.85, sG = 0.6, pG = 0.1).
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Figure 2.5: Optimal Design Strategies for the Manufacturer when sd2 =
0.85, sG = 0.6, pG = 0.1.
2.5. Conclusion
During the design stages of product bundles that are composed of a
durable good and a contingent consumable, such as a printer and a cartridge,
the manufacturer has to consider the interdependence between two compo-
nents and the life-cycle of the product bundle. Since the technological life of
the durable good is long relative to the physical durability of the consumable,
the manufacturer’s design decision has a significant impact on the long-term
profitability of the firm. In this chapter, we consider the optimal design de-
cision faced by a manufacturer, who may choose to make its durable good
compatible with the consumables of a generic consumable industry. Whereas
several situational factors determine the specific way in which a manufacturer
might design its product, some are distinctive in their impact. In particular,
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we focus on the costs of producing the durable and the consumable, the rate at
which the performance of the durable deteriorates, and the quality level of the
generic consumable relative to the consumable produced by the manufacturer.
While the compatibility decision creates competition in the consum-
ables market, competition in the generic consumable industry reduces the
generic consumable price to production cost. Further, the increase in the num-
ber of affordable generic substitutes creates increased demand for the used
durable goods and thereby, some positive value for all used durable goods.
Therefore, a central consideration in the manufacturer’s design decision on
compatibility is the positive value generated by the generic substitutes. In
this chapter, we study the conditions of this important decision by paying at-
tention to the manufacturer who exploits the availability of generic substitutes
for the consumable by designing its product to be compatible with them.
Our results show that generic consumables serve the manufacturer the
best when they can differentiate the market for the durable goods and generate
positive value for the used durable goods. The value of compatibility decision is
greater if the generic manufacturers have a more efficient production process,
i.e. they could make consumables at a lower quality-to-cost ratio relative
to the manufacturer. The fact that compatibility is not always a profitable
alternative in any situation depends on the positive value for the used durable
goods that the generic manufacturers can generate. The optimal strategies are
characterized by thresholds on the production cost of the manufacturer.
Our research makes several contributions to theory and practice. First,
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our work identifies the effect of generic contingent components on the durable
goods in the profitability of the firms. This is especially significant in a glob-
ally competitive market where low cost and considerably simple technology
consumables are often quickly produced by generic firms. Second, when the
original consumable manufacturer is faced with a generic consumable industry
that is more efficient in making the consumable, it is expected for the manu-
facturer to deter the entry of potentially efficient competitors. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, our findings suggest that he could actually improve his
profit earnings after the entry of the generic industry. Third, we develop a con-
cise analytical framework for understanding design decisions on compatibility
with a rival industry, which takes into account the different factors that affect
ex post market structure. Managers of firms that provide similar products
may find this framework valuable in considering the impact of competition
before making a compatibility decision.
Although the stylized assumptions of our model let us study the central
questions in detail, several assumptions and their influence on our findings need
to be acknowledged. First, we only consider the relation between a durable
good and a contingent consumable. This limits the applicability of our model
to certain product categories. Another limitation of our model is that we
focus on a two period model. However, most products are used for several
periods. A different model that allows the interaction between the durable
good and the consumables for several number of periods could demonstrate the
manufacturer’s strategy, consumers’ expectations and compatibility decisions,
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and hence, yield different results.
A potential extension of our work could build on our analysis and de-
velop a framework for evaluating the impact of competition for the durable
goods, firms that face competition for their durable goods may be more will-
ing to accommodate third-party manufacturers to increase their consumer de-
mand. In addition, we can try our model with different distribution functions
for the consumer valuations that could generate different insights. Investigat-
ing these issues will enhance our understanding of inter-firm interactions in
such industries and consumer behavior.
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Chapter 3
Commercializing Component Innovations: The
Roles of Firm Capabilities and Network Effects
3.1. Introduction
In many technology-intensive industries, firms have become increas-
ingly specialized in designing and manufacturing certain parts of a product,
while relying on external sources for other essential component technologies.
Therefore, products sold to end-consumers are produced by integrating many
functional modules. This combination of technological specialization and mod-
ularity of product architecture permits component-level innovators to consider
broader avenues of commercializing their technological breakthroughs beyond
simply using them in their own products. A firm’s commercialization strategy
for a component level innovation can have significant implications, particularly
when the potential recipient of component-level knowledge also competes with
the innovator in the product market.
Technological innovations often result in increasing not only the per-
formance of an individual product, but also the magnitude of the network
benefits that can accrue to users in many products such as mobile phones,
interactive software and media players. If a firm licenses her innovation to
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rivals, she may be able to benefit from the increase in network benefits in the
industry. However, since rival firms would be able to increase the quality of the
products that they offer, the innovator must trade-off the benefits of increased
network effects against the costs of increased competition when considering a
commercialization strategy. In this chapter, we model and compare alterna-
tive commercialization strategies for the component innovator when sharing a
breakthrough with a rival can increase the network value of the component.
The manner in which the component innovator commercializes her tech-
nology depends not only on the value the breakthrough adds to her own prod-
uct, but also on the rival’s ability to integrate the component technology with
his own product. In some situations, the firm that develops a revolutionary in-
novation may not be the best suited to commercializing it. For example, when
the small software firm, Upstartle, developed a web-based word-processing
technology called Writely, it lacked the scale, synergy, and ability to fully ex-
ploit the capabilities of this software. Upstartle allowed itself to be acquired
by Google who, by integrating Writely into its existing suite of products was
in a better position to obtain economic benefits from the new technology.
Further, the commercialization strategy is influenced by the extent to
which sharing the component technology can strengthen network effects be-
tween products. For example, consider the approach Nokia has taken in com-
mercializing its versatile and powerful application platform for smart phones,
the S60 (formerly known as Series 60). A smartphone user derives more value
from a software component like S60 if a wider array of applications are avail-
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able for this platform. Since application developers are attracted to more
popular platforms, the consumers derive a greater utility from a smartphone
with a more popular application platform. Therefore, in addition to installing
S60 on its own mobile phones, Nokia has also actively licensed the platform
to rival manufacturers like Lenovo, LG and Samsung (Electronic Engineering
Times, 2002). Similarly, Research-in-Motion (RIM) Technologies’ innovation
resulted in a dramatic improvement in the performance of personal digital as-
sistants (PDAs) and the advent of the phenomenally successful Blackberry. In
this situation, RIM could have kept its technology to itself (at least until oth-
ers developed similar functionalities), but it chose not to. Instead, it licensed
its software to a host of rivals, including PalmSource, Nokia, and Motorola
(Business Week, 2004).
In networked markets, licensing technological innovations to rivals can
also serve to overcome incompatibilities between various products. As an il-
lustrative example, an innovative cellular phone manufacturer might achieve
a breakthrough with respect to the component technology that allows pho-
tographs to be taken, stored, manipulated, and transferred. However, if the
innovator’s and rival’s products use different file formatting standards, con-
sumers of one product would not be able to share their photographs with
consumers of the other one. The media sharing service Vizrea is available for
free to users of mobile phones that have S60 installed. But a subscriber is
unable to share photos instantly with a friend whose phone is not S60 en-
abled. By licensing the S60 suite, Nokia has effectively increased the level of
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compatibility with other cellular phones.
The various strategies used by the firms in these examples, and several
others, to bring a component innovation to the market may be broadly grouped
under three categories: (a) Captive use that makes the innovator the sole
firm with the component technology; (b) Licensing to a rival, subsequent to
which the innovator competes with the rival in the product market; (c) Selling
Out, which we define as accepting a fixed payment in return for giving a
rival exclusive rights to the innovation. The merits and disadvantages of each
strategy depend on technological characteristics of the innovation as well as
the competitive forces in the industry. We capture these situational elements
in a model where the prospective recipient of the component technology may
already produce a competing product.
We focus on products that are vertically differentiated, and find that the
innovator is generally more willing to share (license or sell-out) her component
technology with competitors whose capability to develop other components for
the product and integrate it with the component technology are significantly
different from her own abilities. This insight extends to situations in which
the competitor already has a presence in the market. Our analysis shows that
in product classes with stronger network effects, component innovations have
a greater likelihood of being licensed. Although this may result in the emer-
gence of closely competing end-products, it leads to widespread adoption of the
component technology itself, thus benefiting the innovator. This explains the
seemingly counter-intuitive behavior of innovators with radical breakthroughs,
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who willingly license or sell-out to close competitors.
The modeling framework developed in this chapter extends prior re-
search in this area in several important and realistic dimensions. A significant
portion of this work deals with interactions between a component innovator
and a rival who is stronger in other aspects of product development. The
model also captures the interdependence between the competitor’s capability
and the network value added to the component by licensing to him. The rela-
tive attractiveness of different commercialization strategies also depend on the
change in compatibility between existing products due to technology sharing.
The remainder of our chapter is organized as follows. The next section
reviews literature relevant to this work. Section 3.3 details our model. We
analyze the optimal strategy for the technology innovator in uncontested mar-
kets in Section 3.4 and in contested markets in Section 3.5. We conclude with
a discussion of our results and insights in Section 3.6.
3.2. Literature Review
The central issue that we consider in this research concerns the com-
parison of various commercialization alternatives for innovators in industries
that are characterized by vertical differentiation and network effects. Here we
briefly review the two streams of literature that closely relate to our work:
licensing of innovations; and network externalities and their effect on new
product strategy.
52
The study of technology licensing has been a subject of longstanding
interest in the economics literature. This literature has dealt in depth with the
questions of what technologies should be licensed, to whom, and how licensing
contracts should be structured (see Kamien (1992) for a detailed survey). An
important factor in these decisions is whether or not the innovator (who holds
the patent on the technology) is active in the product market. Several papers
have assumed that innovators do not compete with their licensees, and have
focused on the problem of selecting the form of licensing and the number of
licensees that should be considered (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Kamien et al.,
1992; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Erat et al., 2006). In contrast, we focus on a
firm that possesses a component-level breakthrough that can be licensed to a
competitor, whose capacity to develop other components for the end-product
may be quite different from the innovator. As we elaborate in § 4.3, the
component innovator in our model also has the freedom to determine whether
she wants to participate in the product market, the technology market, or both.
Other papers that consider licensing to potential rivals either do not consider
product differentiation (Arora et al., 2001; Erkal, 2005; Katz and Shapiro, 1985;
Costa and Dierickx, 2002, 2005; Fauli-Oller and Sandonis, 2003), or assume
that licensing will lead to the creation of rivals whose production processes
continue to be inferior to the innovator’s (Fosfuri and Roca, 2004; Shepard,
1987; Sun et al., 2004; Gallini and Winter, 1985; Rockett, 1990).
Understandably, the literature has generally ignored a more recent
trend in technological innovation. Many significant advances often arise at
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small and entrepreneurial firms that, unlike more established firms, may not
have the complementary expertise required to develop other necessary com-
ponents and launch the final product (Gans and Stern, 2003). One of the
main contributions of our research is to extend some insights from the existing
licensing literature to instances where the innovator’s ability to commercialize
the technology might be weaker than that of a potential licensee. Further,
with the notable exception of Costa and Dierickx (2005), papers that model
licensing to rivals as an interactive, game-theoretic process have assumed that
the primary purpose of the technology is to improve production processes.
However, it is well known that product patents are more effective than process
patents in permitting the innovator to derive income from licensing (Levin
et al., 1987). As a result, a technology that improves the quality of final
products or creates new product classes is more likely to be patented than a
technology that merely reduces production costs for existing products (Cohen
and Klepper, 1996). Therefore, in this work, we focus on innovations that lead
to enhancements in product quality rather than reductions in production cost.
Because these innovations effect the extent of differentiation among products,
they are fundamentally different from those that reduce costs.
Most of the early work debating the value of licensing to a rival fo-
cuses on the rent dissipation that occurs due to increased competition and
revenues that are directly realized from licensing (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003).
But in markets with network externalities of consumption, licensing can play
a more strategic role. Network externalities are said to exist when the value
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a consumer derives from a product depends on the number of users who have
compatible products. For discussions of the origins and impacts of network
effects, see Kauffman et al. (2000); Katz and Shapiro (1985); and Farrell and
Saloner (1985). When consumers value the presence of similar users in the
network, firms may use several levers such as compatibility (Baake and Boom,
2001; Bental and Spiegel, 1995), pricing (Dhebar and Oren, 1985; Xie and
Sirbu, 1995) and encouragement of clones (Conner, 1995; Economides, 1996)
to compete effectively. If licensing results in moving products to a common
technological standard, it can also increase the compatibility between products
offered (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). Therefore, we consider situations
in which licensing has the potential to create compatibility between products
that would not be compatible otherwise.
Our work is closest in spirit to two of the aforementioned papers. Con-
ner (1995) argues that in the presence of positive network externalities, an
incumbent firm might benefit by encouraging a compatible clone to enter,
even if it can costlessly thwart this entry. Sun et al. (2004) extend this work
and discuss conditions under which a firm can benefit by developing its own
clone (that is through product line extension) instead of licensing to create an
external clone. Both of these papers examine how the entry of a rival affects
the profits of the innovator, and assume that if the rival enters, he produces
a lower quality product than does the innovator. However, many technolog-
ical innovations occur in industries that already include more than one firm.
If entry barriers are high, the only practical candidates to whom the tech-
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nology can be licensed will already be in the industry, and will continue to
be there even if the technology is not licensed. Moreover, when innovation
occurs at the component level, the firm that achieves a breakthrough in one
particular component technology may not necessarily have the best overall
product quality. In such cases, the innovator must consider whether to license
her breakthrough to a firm that has higher levels of quality in other compo-
nent technologies, which would allow him to offer a product of greater overall
performance quality to the market.
In our model, we address these issues by allowing for the possibility that
the innovator will face a rival even if she does not license her technology, and
by relaxing the assumption that the product introduced by the rival/licensee
is necessarily inferior than that introduced by the innovator. By allowing
for these possibilities, we are able to explore some practical issues related to
how technological innovations should be licensed among existing rivals in an
industry.
3.3. Model
In this section, we introduce our assumptions concerning consumer pref-
erences, the industry structure and the technology sharing decisions made by
an innovator and her rival. Throughout the chapter, we adopt the convention




We assume that consumers derive utility in two ways: the intrinsic
value of being able to use the product in isolation, plus an additional value
from being able to interact with a network of other consumers. To allow for
differentiation among consumers, we assume that their valuation for quality,
v, is uniformly distributed on the interval [−N, 1]1, and normalize the number
of consumers in the market to 1. A consumer with valuation v receives the
following utility from a product, indexed by j, that has quality sj:
Uj (v; sj, Qj) = (v + θQj) sj (3.1)
where Qj represents the number of other consumers who have products that
are compatible with product j, and θ is a parameter indicating the strength of
the network effects. Throughout our analysis, we assume that θ < 8/9, which
is slightly more restrictive that the standard assumption that θ < 1 to ensure
that the demand function be downward sloping. Allowing for θ ∈ (8/9, 1]
complicates the analysis and contributes little additional insight. However, we
do discuss the implications of this restriction in Appendix B.1.
In the utility function shown in Equation 3.1, vsj can be interpreted
as the intrinsic utility that the consumer would obtain from the product if he
1The main reason that we allow for negative valuations is to avoid situations in which
the market is covered in equilibrium. Further, we assume that N is sufficiently large such
that the whole market (1 + N consumers) will not be covered under any of the scenarios we
consider in this chapter.
However, a negative valuation can be interpreted as a situation in which the disutility
that a consumer has from searching for and obtaining the product is greater than the utility
that he receives from using it.
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were to use it in total isolation, while θQjsj represents the additional utility
that he receives from interacting with other users in the network. It is worth
noting that this utility function implies that consumers do not differ in their
willingness to pay for network effects, yet the network benefits a consumer
derives from his or her product are proportional to the quality of the product
(θQjsj). Researchers who have studied markets with network effects previ-
ously have also used similar models (Conner, 1995; Sun et al., 2004). This is
characteristic of many common products with network benefits such as instant
messengers and document managers. For example, while all subscribers to a
cell phone network find it convenient to converse with each other, only those
with special handsets are able to use more advanced network features such as
instant picture messaging.
It should also be recognized that the utility function in (3.1) allows us
to consider the implications of compatibility between two different products,
depending upon how we define Qj. For example, let d1 and d2 be the installed
bases for two different products respectively. If the two products are incom-
patible, then Q1 = d1 and Q2 = d2. Alternatively, if the two products are
compatible, then Q1 = Q2 = d1 + d2.
3.3.2 The Innovator and the Licensing Opportunity
We adopt the perspective of an innovative firm that has achieved a
component innovation that will allow her to introduce a product of quality s.
The quality of the final product depends both on the quality of the focal com-
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ponent (where the innovation is applied) as well as on other components that
are contained in the final product. Without loss of generality, we normalize
s = 1 in the rest of this chapter. To maintain our focus on the comparison of
inter-firm technology transfer options, we assume that the only participants in
the industry are this innovator and one potential licensee who may or may not
be able to offer a rival product if the component technology is not licensed.
We focus on two dimensions along which the innovator may be distin-
guished from her rival/licensee: the fixed cost that each firm would need to
invest in order to develop and launch the end-product, and the performance
quality of the product that each firm could launch. Let K represent the fixed
development cost that would be incurred by the rival if he were to introduce
a product that incorporates the new technology. Such costs are typically in-
curred in designing and developing other components for the product, and in
installing the production and distribution infrastructure for the new product.
Although the innovator also incurs development costs, we assume that much of
her cost has already been incurred in obtaining the technological breakthrough
and that her incremental investment for product development is less than that
for the rival. For simplicity, we assume that these incremental development
costs are zero for the innovator.
The second dimension along which the two firms differ is in terms of
their capabilities regarding the other complementary component technologies.
Although the innovation that we are considering improves the performance of
a single component in the product, the overall product quality experienced
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by the consumer is a function of the performance of this component as well
as all of the other components in the product. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the total quality of the innovator’s product is equal to 1,
and consider how access to the innovation will affect the total quality of the
rival’s product. Let α0 be the total quality level of a product that the rival
could introduce without access to the innovation, and α > α0 be the total
quality of the product that he could introduce if he incorporates the innovation
into his product. In addition to expertise on complementary components, the
parameter α may also represent a composite of several attributes of the rival
such as component integration ability that the rival may have acquired by
producing similar products, his distribution and service systems, his brand
equity and production efficiency2.
We devote most of our analysis to situations in which licensing the
technology would not alter the ordering of product quality between the two
firms, i.e. either 0 ≤ α0 < α < 1, or 1 < α0 < α. We refer to these two cases
as the rival being either weaker (stronger) than the innovator. In general we
assume that although licensing can improve the quality of the rival’s product,
it cannot allow him to leap-frog the innovator. However we do consider leap-
frogging for the special case where α0 = 0 and α > 1. This represents the
situation in which the rival does not currently offer a product in the category,
but if he did, he would be able to produce a higher quality product than the
2It may also depend on attributes of the technology itself (such as modularity), which
determine the efficacy with which another firm can use the innovator’s invention.
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innovator. For example, one could argue that when RIM developed its PDA
software, other firms that were already producing large volumes of cellular
phones had capabilities in other component technologies that may have allowed
them to offer higher total quality products than RIM if they had access to the
innovative software.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that, if the innovator licenses her
technology, then her product will be network compatible with the rival’s prod-
uct. However, we consider situations in which, in the absence of licensing,
the two products would be incompatible. Although it is possible that a com-
ponent level innovation would not create compatibility between incompatible
products, these situations are not very interesting. Nevertheless, we briefly
discuss the implications of insurmountable incompatibility for technology li-
censing in our conclusions.
Finally, we assume that the marginal costs of production are identical
for the two firms and that these costs can be normalized to zero. As described
in (Krishnan and Zhu, 2006), in many industries in which technological in-
novation plays a large role, e.g. pharmaceuticals, electronics, software and
entertainment, the marginal costs are negligible relative to the cost of devel-
opment. In addition, to avoid trivial situations in which a rival is unable to
enter a market even when the technology is licensed exclusively to him, we as-
sume that K is not prohibitively high - in particular, we assume K ≤ 3.33114.
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3.3.3 Strategies for the Innovator
The innovator has three options with respect to her participation in
the product market and the technology market: licensing, selling out, and
captive use. We discuss the different merits and mechanics of these different
approaches below.
Licensing . When the innovator licenses the component technology, the qual-
ity of her licensee’s product increases from α0 to α. Also, by establishing a
common technological platform, licensing ensures that the products manufac-
tured by the two firms are compatible with each other. Whereas the increase
in the licensee’s product quality leads to stronger competition in many cases,
this leads to the creation of a large base of users, and consequently, increases
each consumer’s willingness to pay for the end-products. In some cases, by
licensing the technology to a firm with superior capabilities in complemen-
tary components, she might reap the networking benefits without increasing
competitive intensity.
When two products are available, each consumer purchases the product
that maximizes his or her surplus. The stronger (weaker) firm serves the high-
end (low-end) segment of the market. We can identify two critical levels of
consumer valuation, vl ≤ vh, such that consumers with valuations in [vl, vh)
purchase from the low-end firm while consumers with valuations in [vh, 1]
purchase from the high-end firm and consumers with valuations in [−N, vl)
purchase nothing. Let Qh (ph, pl) and Ql (ph, pl) denote the network sizes of the
high-end and low-end firms, respectively. In the particular case where licensing
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leads to a common technological platform, we set Qh (ph, pl) = Ql (ph, pl) =
1− vl. The marginal consumers vh and vl can be characterized as follows
(vh + θQh (ph, pl)) αh − ph = (vh + θQl (ph, pl)) αl − pl
(vl + θQl (ph, pl)) αl − pl = 0
(3.2)
The corresponding demands for the high-end and the low-end firms are rep-
resented by dh (ph, pl) = 1 − vh and dl (ph, pl) = vh − vl, respectively. Sub-
sequently, the high-end firm with development cost Kh and the low-end firm
with Kl set prices ph and pl simultaneously to maximize their profits, πh =
phdh (ph, pl) −Kh and πl = pldl (ph, pl) −Kl, respectively. We find the Nash
equilibrium prices set by the two firms and the corresponding profits.
We assume that the innovator makes a Take-It-or-Leave-It (TIOLI)
offer to the rival3. She offers to share the technology with the rival for a fixed
licensing fee, F 4. If the offer is accepted, the innovator and the licensee produce
compatible products of qualities 1 and α, respectively. The innovator’s product
will be perceived as the high-end product if α < 1. Similarly, when the licensee
is stronger than the innovator, i.e. α > 1, the highest valuation consumers
buy the licensee’s product, while consumers with intermediate valuations buy
the innovator’s product.
3Our approach is sufficient to understand when licensing will occur, even if it overstates
the profits that might be earned by the innovator compared to a more sophisticated modeling
approach like Bargaining.
4Several authors have compared various forms of licensing contracts involving fixed fees
and royalties with regard to their efficiency in coordinating the incentives of the licensor
and the licensee (Erkal, 2005; Kamien, 1992; Sun et al., 2004). However, our intention is to
analyze the relative appropriateness of various forms of commercialization. Contracts with
royalties require stringent monitoring processes, which are often cumbersome and difficult
to enforce in practice.
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Selling Out. Under this option, the innovator surrenders the right to use the
component technology to her rival. This is a common exit strategy for inno-
vators in knowledge-based industries such as Bio-Tech (Forbes, 2005), which
relieves them from the burden of developing and marketing a product based on
their innovation. The technology elevates the quality of the acquirer’s prod-
uct from α0 to α, and additionally, he does not face competition from the
innovator.
As before, we assume that the innovator may offer a TIOLI contract to
sell the technology for a fixed price to her rival. To ensure that the innovator
will not develop a product that will eventually compete with the rival, firms
often incorporate specific clauses in such contracts that gives the acquiring firm
the exclusive right to incorporate the component technology into a product.
The rival becomes a monopolist firm and sets a price in order to maximize its
profit.
Captive Use . And finally, the innovator may find it advantageous to not
share the technology with her rival. When the innovation is captively used in
a new product introduced in an uncontested market, the innovator acts as a
monopolist, and prices her product to maximize her profit. When the market
is contested, the demands for the two products depend on the rival’s product
quality α0 as well as the initial compatibility between them. In contested mar-
kets, the innovator may benefit from the rival’s presence even though licensing
may not occur. On the other hand, the rival may force the innovator to enter
into a mutually detrimental price war without actually benefiting significantly
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from the process himself. In such cases, the innovator may benefit by buying
out the rival, in addition to captively using the component technology, to max-
imize the market potential for the innovation. As in the licensing and selling
out cases, we assume that the acquisition is preceded by a TIOLI offer from
the innovator, and followed by her price-setting.
3.4. Commercialization in Uncontested Markets
Our analysis applies the standard approach of backward induction. We
derive the equilibrium prices at which the firm(s) sell their respective prod-
ucts under various strategies and the corresponding profits. Subsequently, we
compare the innovator’s profits across these approaches and derive conditions
under which licensing, selling out and captive use are optimal. In this sec-
tion, we focus on the situation in which the rival does not currently have a
product in the category, i.e. α0 = 0, which we refer to as an uncontested
market. Further, since the rival plays a competing role in the market only if
the technology is licensed, we use the terms licensee and rival interchangeably
when we discuss uncontested markets. Commercialization of innovations in
contested markets is considered later in § 3.5.
3.4.1 Interactions with a Weaker Licensee
When the innovator is stronger than the licensee (α < 1), the innova-
tor is able to generate larger profits as a monopolist with her own product
than rival could if his lower quality product were the only one in the market.
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Therefore, it is not profitable to sell out the innovation. The innovator’s cen-
tral decision therefore, is to determine whether to license the innovation to its
rival (and compete with him) or remain a monopolist. Her strategy depends
on both the relative strength (α) of the rival and on the strength of network
effects in the market (θ).
When the licensee is weaker than the innovator, licensing leads to the
emergence of a weakly competitive clone (α < 1) of her product. Weak clones
are useful in establishing a wide installed base for the technology, which she
could have created only by significantly reducing the price of its product. If it
is beneficial to license, she sets a licensing fee Fw that will induce the licensee
to accept the TIOLI offer. Let pi and pc represent the prices that the innovator
and the competitor set subsequently to maximize their respective revenues.5
If pc > pi, no consumer buys the rival’s product. However, since the rival
can always lower his product’s price to increase demand, this never occurs in
equilibrium. For any αpi ≥ pc, there exists a marginal consumer vi that is
indifferent between the innovator’s and rival’s product, and a marginal con-
sumer vc that is indifferent between buying the rival’s product and not buying
at all. As we show in (3.4) below, αpi > pc in equilibrium. All consumers
with valuations in [vc, vi) purchase from the rival while consumers with val-
uations in [vi, 1] purchase from the innovator and consumers with valuations
in [−N, vc) purchase nothing. Let us use superscript w to indicate the prices
5In the rest of the chapter, we use subscripts i and c to refer to demands, prices and
profits for the innovator’s and her competitor/licensee’s products, respectively.
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and profits when the rival is weaker than the innovator.
By setting the network sizes Qi (pi, pc) = Qc (pi, pc) = 1 − vc and
finding the marginal consumers vi and vc in (3.2), the corresponding demands
for the situation when the rival is weaker are
dwi (pi, pc) =
α(pc+(1−α)−pi(1−θ))−θpc
α(1−θ)(1−α)




We solve the following profit maximization problems for the innovator and the
rival, simultaneously. We obtain the Nash equilibrium prices of the two firms
pwi , p
w
c and the corresponding profits πwi , πwc as
pwi (α) =
2 (1− α)
4− (α + 3θ)
pwc (α) =
α (1− α)




(4− (α + 3θ))2
πwc (α) =
α (1− α)
(4− (α + 3θ))2
−K (3.5)
In order to extract from the rival the benefits of licensing the technology, the
innovator sets a licensing fee of Fw = πwc (α) in an uncontested market.
Alternatively, if the innovator captively uses the innovation in an un-
contested market, there exists marginal consumer vm, such that all consumers






The demand for the product at this price is given by 1− vm. Maximizing the
monopoly profit, pm (1− vm), the price and revenue expressions in this case,








In the following proposition, we derive conditions under which the innovator
can profit by licensing in an uncontested market. The conditions are based on
a set of thresholds with respect to K and α. The exact functions that define
all thresholds presented in the chapter are given in Technical Supplement at
the end of this chapter 6. To distinguish these results from those in which the
innovator faces a competitive product regardless of whether she licenses, we
use the subscript M in αwM to indicate the setting in which she would be in an
uncontested market if she did not license.
Proposition 3.4.1. Licensing to a Weaker rival in an Uncontested
Market
When the rival is weaker than the innovator (α < 1), the innovator’s optimal
strategy can be characterized as follows:
a) For each θ ∈ [0, 8/9):
i) There exists a threshold Kw (θ) such that the innovator does not license her
innovation if K ≥ Kw.
ii) If K < Kw, there exists a threshold αwM (θ, K) such that the innovator
6We include the independent parameters for the thresholds when they are introduced,
and suppress the parameters in subsequent discussions.
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licenses her innovation if 0 ≤ α ≤ αwM (θ,K) ≤ 1. Otherwise, the innovator
uses the captive use strategy.
b) The threshold, αwM (θ, K), is increasing in θ and decreasing in K. The
threshold Kw(θ) is increasing in θ.
Proposition 3.4.1 shows that in an uncontested market with entry costs
(K < Kw), the innovator could find it profitable to license an innovation to her
rival, even when she has the option of becoming a monopolist. To understand
the above result, note that licensing has two consequences for the innovator -
increased competition due to presence of another product and stronger network
effects owing to a wider installed base. While the adverse effect of competition
is larger when α is higher, the complementary value of another product con-
tributing to the innovator’s network increases with θ. As a result, when θ is
smaller, the innovator licenses only if the rival would produce a lower quality
imitation of its own product. However, as θ increases, the value of network
benefits increases, allowing the innovator to license the technology to a rival
whose product is closer in quality to its own product. This is reflected in the
relationship between αwM and θ. If the entry cost exceeds Kw, the maximum
possible licensing fee would not justify technology sharing from the innovator’s
perspective. Since the synergistic benefits increase with θ for both firms, the
innovator finds the licensee’s presence in the market desirable even at higher
costs at higher levels of θ. As a result, Kw increases with θ.
The relationship between αwM and θ is illustrated in Figure 3.1. When
θ = 0.5, the innovator will not license the technology to a rival with α = 0.65
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even if the rival does not incur any development cost (0.65 < αwM (0.5, 0) = 0.6).
However, if the strength of network effects increases to θ = 0.6, she would li-
cense to the same rival because αwM (0.6, 0) = 0.7.
Figure 3.1: Profit Difference Curves for the Licensor between Licensing to
a Weaker Licensee and Captively Using the Innovation in an Uncontested
Market, for the values of θ = 0.5 and θ = 0.6.
The benefit of competition in a networked environment has been stud-
ied before. Conner (1995) and Sun et al. (2004) suggest that an innovator
might encourage an imitation of her product by rivals when network external-
ities are present and show that such an inducement might generate not only a
larger installed base, but also higher demand for the innovator’s product, than
when the innovator acts as a single product monopolist. They show that an
increased user base could help the innovator’s profits more than the increased
competition hurts it. In these circumstances, an innovator has an incentive to
accommodate an imitation even if it violates the patent protecting the com-
ponent technology - we refer to such clones as infringing imitations. We know
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from Conner that there exists a threshold ᾱ(θ) such that the innovator would
benefit from an infringing imitation only if α ≤ ᾱ(θ).
Proposition 3.4.2. Licensing and Infringing Imitation
In an uncontested market, the innovator licenses its innovation to a weaker
rival, but does not accommodate an infringing imitation by the same rival if
ᾱ(θ) < α ≤ αwM (θ,K).
Further, for each value of θ, ᾱ(θ) ≤ αwM (θ,K).
While encouraging an infringing imitation increases the profit that the
innovator derives from her own product, by licensing she can also extract all
of the rival’s increase in profits. As a result, even in some cases where the
innovator might shun imitation fearing increased competition, she will license
the use of the component technology for a fee (ᾱ(θ) < α ≤ αwM (θ,K)) .
3.4.2 Interactions with a Stronger Licensee
In many industries, young and entrepreneurial firms are frequently at
the forefront of innovation. Such firms may license their innovations to more
established firms that may be able to bring to market that is perceived as
having higher total quality. This case can be captured in our model by setting
αl = 1 and αh = α in (3.2). The innovator offers to license her technology for
a fixed licensing fee, Fs, through a TIOLI contract. As was the case for the
weaker licensee, it can be shown that, in equilibrium, there will be two critical
levels of consumer valuation, vi < vc, such that consumers with valuations in
the interval (vc, 1] buy the higher quality product, while consumers in (vi, vc]
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buy the lower quality product. These valuations for the marginal consumers,
vi and vc, can be characterized by setting Qi (pi, pc) = Qc (pi, pc) = 1− vi. To
distinguish the equilibrium prices and profits in this case from those when the
the rival is weaker, we use the superscript s to denote a stronger rival.
For the case in which the licensee is stronger than the innovator, the
demands for the two products can be characterized as follows, so long as
pc ≥ αpi (Note that, it is easy to confirm that pc > αpi in equilibrium):
dsc (pi, pc) =
(α−1)+pi(1−αθ)−pc(1−θ)
(1−θ)(α−1)




Simultaneously maximizing the profit functions for the innovator, we compute






α (4− 3θ)− 1
psc (α) =
2 (α− 1) α




(1− α (4− 3θ))2
πsc (α) =
4 (α− 1) α2
(1− α (4− 3θ))2
−K (3.10)
Just as we did for the case of a weaker rival, we assume that, if the innovator
licenses her innovation to a rival who could not introduce a product without
it, she can can set the licensing fee to Fs = πsc (α).
Alternatively, the innovator can consider selling-out, by granting the
licensee exclusive rights to the technology. If exclusive rights to the technology
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are acquired by the rival, he sets a monopoly price of pcm for the new product.
All consumers in (vcm, 1] buy the product, where vcm represents the valuation






The demand for the product at this price is given by 1 − vcm. The licensee









The innovator charges a fee F = π∗cm (α) in this case. While the apparent
choices include captive use, licensing and selling out, the captive use option
is sub-optimal for an innovator facing a stronger rival (α > 1) when the rival
does not incur any product development costs (K = 0).
In the following proposition, which parallels Proposition 3.4.1, we derive
conditions under which the innovator can profit by licensing to a stronger rival
in a market that would be uncontested without licensing. As we did in the
previous proposition, we use the subscript M to indicate that the innovator
would be in an uncontested market if she did not license. The superscripts cs,
sl and lc denote the threshold α values between captive use (c), selling out
(s) and licensing (l) strategies. For example, αcsM denotes the value of α that
73
makes the uncontested innovator indifferent between selling out and captively
using the technology.
Proposition 3.4.3. Licensing to a Stronger rival in an Uncontested
Market
In uncontested markets (α0 = 0) with a stronger rival, there exists a threshold
Ks such that the optimal strategy can be characterized as follows,
a) If K < Ks, then there exist two thresholds, αcsM(θ, K) < αslM(θ, K), such
that the innovator uses the captive use strategy if 1 ≤ α ≤ αcsM(θ,K), sells
out the technology if αcsM(θ, K) < α ≤ αslM(θ,K), and licenses the technology if
αslM(θ, K) < α.
b) If K ≥ Ks, then there exists a threshold αlcM(θ,K) > 1 such that the
innovator uses the captive use strategy if 1 ≤ α ≤ αlcM(θ,K), and licenses
the technology if αlcM(θ, K) < α. In this case, the innovator never sells out the
technology.
c) αcsM(θ,K), αslM(θ,K), αlcM(θ,K) and Ks are monotonically decreasing in the
strength of network effects θ.
As Proposition 3.4.3 shows, the weak innovator may sell her technol-
ogy to a stronger rival in many circumstances. Whereas a stronger innovator
perceives the market for technology sharing as an additional opportunity to
increase her revenues, transactions in technology transfer may be the primary
source of revenues for the weak innovator. Therefore, if the licensee’s develop-
ment cost is not excessive (K < Ks), selling out is a profitable exit strategy for
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the innovator if the licensee is strong enough to overcome development costs
(α > αcsM(θ,K)), yet not so strong that both products can coexist without
indulging in severe price competition
(
α < αslM(θ, K)
)
.
Selling out, however, is not always a viable exit strategy. While the
licensee’s development cost K does not affect the revenues of the two firms
after licensing, the development cost K limits the size of the licensing fee F
that can be collected by the innovator. As a result, her incentive to license
or sell the innovation decreases with K. Consequently, the innovator should
be more inclined to either use the captive use or licensing strategies when the
rival incurs a larger development cost. As a result, we find that when K ≥ Ks,
selling out is never optimal.
To further understand the conditions that determine the optimal com-
mercialization strategy, we consider a numerical example. Suppose the basic
quality of the innovator’s product is s = 1. Figure 3.2 shows the industry pa-
rameters (θ, α) for which captive use (C), selling out (S) and licensing (L) are
optimal strategies for the innovator. We separately consider two cases where
the development costs are significantly high (K ≥ Ks) and low (K < Ks).
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a. K < Ks b. K ≥ Ks
Figure 3.2: Commercialization Strategy in an Uncontested Market with a
Strong rival for various values of α and θ.
(a) K = .1, (b) K = .5
Consider the case in which the rival incurs significant development costs
if he licenses or purchases the right to use the innovation (K ≥ Ks). In Figure
3.2.b, we see that the innovator prefers to captively use the technology when
there are neither strong network effects nor large improvements in product
quality from licensing. From § 3.4.1, recall that the innovator trades off the
benefit of having a larger network against the cost of increased competition.
Therefore, when network effects are stronger, the innovator is more willing
to license smaller innovations to the rival though the reduced product differ-
entiation leads to more intense competition. This is reflected in the inverse
dependency of αlcM on θ.
When K is smaller, as Figure 3.2.a shows, the innovator has a larger
incentive to sellout to the stronger rival. The decision to stay in the market af-
ter licensing, however, depends on θ and α. While the two firms will mutually
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benefit due to network effects when θ is larger, the products they offer will not
be sufficiently differentiated if α is small. Therefore, we find that the innovator
should follow the captive use strategy for small values of α (α < αcsM), the rival
acquires the innovation for intermediate levels of α
(










. The fact that the thresholds αcsM , αslM and Ks decrease with
θ can be attributed to the shift in the tradeoff between network benefits and
competition explained above.
3.5. Licensing Innovations in Contested Markets
Thus far, we have considered strategies for exploiting innovations that
create new product categories. In accordance, we assumed that a rival will
not be able to develop a product that interacts with the innovator’s unless the
innovator sells out or licenses it to him. In this section, we consider innovations
that improve the performance of products in existing product categories.
In particular, we assume that the rival currently manufactures a prod-
uct of quality α0 (α0 > 0). By obtaining the right to use the innovation, he
will be able to improve the quality to α (α > α0). We consider two cases: the
rival is said to be weaker when his product is always lower in quality relative
to the innovator’s product (α0 < α < 1); he is said to be stronger if his of-
fering is of higher quality (1 < α0 < α)7. Furthermore, a rival who is already
7There is also the possibility that the rival’s product quality leapfrogs the innovator’s
after licensing (α0 < 1 < α). While we do not consider this explicitly in this section, we
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active in manufacturing a competing product would not incur the additional
development costs for other components or installation costs for a distribu-
tion infrastructure. Therefore, we ignore these costs in this section by setting
K = 0.
In a contested market, when the innovator develops an improved com-
ponent technology, she competes with a rival product, regardless of whether
she licenses her innovation. The optimal prices and profits depend on the com-
patibility between products and the relative strength of the rival. When the
innovation is such that the innovator’s new product and the rival’s competing
product are compatible even in the absence of technology sharing, we refer
to it as a compatible innovation. Here, the innovator’s profits are derived by
setting α = α0 in (3.5) and (3.10) in § 3.4.1 and § 3.4.2 above.
When the innovation occurs at a fundamental, architectural level, the
products may not be compatible prior to licensing. For example, consider the
case of a technological innovation that improves the quality of a personal com-
munications device, compatible versions of which are being sold by the two
firms. If the innovation serves to increase the fidelity of a data-transfer mech-
anism, the devices will continue to be compatible when the new technology is
incorporated in the innovator’s product. However, if the innovation alters the
data-transfer protocols in fundamental ways, the two versions will be unable
to communicate after the innovator installs the new technology in its products.
have already considered a special case (α0 = 0) in § 3.4.2 earlier.
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We simply refer to such innovations as incompatible innovations. Licensing the
technology will unite the two products under a common standard and makes
them compatible.
Note that the source of incompatibility between the innovator’s and
the rival’s products lies elsewhere in the product. However, such persistent
incompatibility, where licensing will not solve the compatibility issue, repre-
sents a trivial decision-making scenario for the innovator. When she is facing
a weaker (stronger) competitor, the innovator always prefers captive use of the
innovation (selling out)8.
Here we derive the equilibrium prices and profits of the two firms
when their products are incompatible. When the innovator faces a weaker
rival (α0 < 1), the marginal consumers, vi and vc, are identified by setting
Qi (pi, pc) = 1 − vi and Qc (pi, pc) = vi − vc in (3.2). The demands for two
incompatible products are derived as





Solving the profit maximization problems for the innovator and the rival si-



















Similarly, when the innovator is faced with a stronger rival (αc = α0 > αi = 1),
we set Qc (pi, pc) = 1− vc and Qi (pi, pc) = vc − vi and find vi and vc in (3.2).








Solving the profit maximization problems for the two firms, the optimal prod-

















3.5.1 Interactions with a Weaker Rival
Proposition 3.5.1 below identifies the optimal commercialization deci-
sion for the innovator when facing a rival who sells a compatible lower quality
product (α0 < α < 1), regardless of whether the technology is licensed or not.
Subsequently, in Proposition 3.5.2, we consider the licensing of incompatible
innovations.
Analogous to the subscript M that represents an innovator in an uncon-
tested market if she did not license, we denote the duopoly with two compatible
products with subscript D.
Proposition 3.5.1. (α0 < α < 1) Compatible Innovation with a Weaker
Rival
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a) For each θ, there exist thresholds αD (α0, θ) and α0D (θ) such that
i) If α ≤ αD, then the innovator licenses a compatible innovation to a weaker
rival.
ii) If α > αD, then the innovator uses the captive use strategy. Further, unless
α0 ≥ α0D, the innovator benefits from the rival’s presence.
b) The threshold αD is non-increasing in α0. Both αD and α0D are increasing
in θ.
Recall that the fundamental trade-off in licensing the technology is
between the cost of increased competition and the network benefits due to a
wider installed base. We find that the window of licensing (α0, αD) is similar
to the interval (0, αwM) identified earlier in Proposition 3.4.1. Further, if the
rival’s product is not sufficiently differentiated from the innovator’s product
(α0 > α0D), price competition dominates network effects.
As the value of network benefits increases with θ, the innovator is in-
creasingly willing to share technologies that reduce product differentiation, i.e.
the gap in product quality. Therefore, the threshold αD increases with θ. More
interestingly, we find that the innovator is less willing to license its technology
when the rival possesses a higher quality alternative (αD ↓ with α0). While
the ex-post network benefits and competitive intensity are not affected by the
relative quality of the rival’s product, the licensing fee, Fw, that the rival is
willing to pay, decreases with α0. As a result, the innovator finds licensing
higher-quality innovations to be unprofitable when α0 is higher.
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In Proposition 3.5.2 below, we present the optimal commercialization
strategies when the innovation makes the two products incompatible unless the
technology is licensed. For these incompatible innovations, the commercializa-
tion strategies are characterized by a pair of thresholds that parallel those in
Proposition 3.5.1. However, the behavior of these thresholds with respect to
α0, the initial quality of the rival, is different.
Proposition 3.5.2. (α0 < α < 1) Incompatible Innovation with a Weaker
Rival
a) For each θ, there exist thresholds αI (α0, θ) and α0I (θ) such that
i) If α ≤ αI , the innovator licenses an incompatible innovation to a weaker
rival.
ii) If α > αI , the innovator uses the captive use strategy. Further, the inno-
vator benefits from the rival’s presence in the market unless α0 ≥ α0I .
b) The threshold αI is non-decreasing in α0.
Similar to the case of licensing compatible innovations, the innovator
finds it profitable to license only those incompatible innovations that lie within
an acceptable window (α0, αI), and acquires the rival’s product if its quality
is substantially close to her own product’s quality (α0 > α0I). For the innova-
tor, licensing is more useful when the innovation is incompatible with a rival’s
product because licensing makes the two products compatible, in addition to
generating revenue through the licensing fee itself. Consider the impact of an
improvement in the rival’s initial product quality on the licensing decision.
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As α0 increases, the opportunity cost of not licensing is higher for the inno-
vator since she faces stiffer competition from an incompatible product. This
increases her willingness to license her technology. Therefore, unlike αD, the
threshold αI is non-decreasing in α0.
This difference in the behavior of thresholds αI and αD highlights the
sensitivity of technology strategy with respect to the fundamental properties
of the technology. Recall that αI and αD represent the highest product quali-
ties that an innovator is willing to give to a rival through licensing. Suppose
the rival comes to possess a technology that improves its product quality to
(α0 + δ) from α0 without affecting its compatibility (where α0 + δ < α). Does
this turn of events make the innovator more or less willing to share its technol-
ogy with the rival? According to our results in this section, the answer really
depends on whether the two products are compatible or not. Therefore, at
higher levels of the rival’s product quality α0, an innovator with a compatible
innovation becomes less interested in sharing, whereas an innovator with an
incompatible innovation is more likely to license.
3.5.2 Interactions with a Stronger Rival
In this section, we consider the interaction of the innovator with a
stronger rival (α > α0 > 1).
Proposition 3.5.3. (α > 1) Licensing to a Stronger rival in a Con-
tested Market
The optimal commercialization strategy for an innovator competing with a
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stronger rival depends on the compatibilities between the products before and
after licensing.
Compatible Innovation. For each θ, there exists a threshold αslM (θ) such
that
a) The innovator licenses a compatible innovation to a stronger rival iff α ≥
αslM .
b) The innovator sells out her technology to the rival iff α0 < α < αslM .
Incompatible Innovation. For each θ, there exists a threshold αl0I (θ) such
that
a) The innovator licenses an incompatible innovation to a stronger rival if
α ≥ αslM or if α0 ≥ αl0I ≥ 1.
b) Otherwise, the innovator sells out her technology to the rival.
First, consider the innovator who licenses a compatible innovation.
While consumers universally benefit from improved product quality and the
expanded network size, the ability of firms to extract consumer surplus dimin-
ishes due to reduced product differentiation. Since her rival is stronger (α > 1),





to avoid aggressive price competition. However, when α is larger, due to the
sufficiently large product differentiation, sharing the innovation with her rival
does not affect the innovator’s ability to stay in the market. Therefore, irre-
spective of α0, innovations that boost the rival’s product quality significantly
will be licensed.
When the innovator faces a stronger rival and develops an incompatible
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innovation, in addition to the reduction in direct price competition, licensing
benefits both firms by increasing the compatibility between their products.
Therefore, captive use is never desirable. When α ≥ αslM , the presence of the
innovator - after licensing - is not only possible, but also desirable. Therefore,
such innovations are licensed. When α0 ≥ αl0I , there is sufficient differen-
tiation between the products to allow the innovator to compete in spite of
having an inferior product. Since technology sharing only serves to increase
both compatibility and differentiation, selling out is unnecessary. Recall from
Proposition 3.4.3 that αslM decreases in θ. Therefore, both incompatible and
compatible innovations are more likely to be licensed if the network effects in
a market are stronger.
3.6. Conclusions
Breakthroughs in critical component technologies provide innovators
the ability to differentiate their product from its competition. Yet component
innovators such as Upstartle, RIM and Vizrea have sought avenues for com-
mercializing their technologies that extend beyond merely incorporating them
in their own products. Their innovations have been licensed despite the fact
that the potential recipient(s) also competes with the licensor in the product
market. In this chapter, we consider the optimal commercialization decision
faced by an innovator, who chooses between captively using the technology in
her own product and licensing it to a rival (sometimes, exclusively). Whereas
several situational factors determine the specific way in which a firm might
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commercialize its innovation, some are distinctive in their impact. In particu-
lar, we focus on the dependence of this decision on two factors: the strength of
network benefits, i.e. the extent to which consumers benefit by using a more
popular product, and the relative strength of the competitor, i.e. the existence
and ability of the competitor in integrating the innovation into a competing
product.
While licensing a component innovation establishes a larger network for
the product, it also allows the competitor to close the quality gap between the
two products (or extend it). Therefore, a central consideration in commercial-
izing an innovation is the tradeoff between increased competition and greater
network benefits. In this research, we advance the study of this important
tradeoff by paying attention to the fact that the rival, in many instances, may
be able to introduce a product with higher overall quality than the innovator’s
product.
Our results show that licensing is often the best strategy for a com-
ponent innovator, even if it comes at the cost of strengthening a significantly
weaker competitor. The value of licensing is greater if the strength of network
effects are larger, or if licensing helps to overcome incompatibilities between
the two products. The fact that licensing is not a profitable alternative in
any situation if network effects are non-existent highlights the important role
such externalities play in determining commercialization strategy. The opti-
mal strategy depends on whether the innovator’s rival is stronger or weaker
than the innovator. In each case, the innovator’s decisions are characterized
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by thresholds on the quality of the competitor’s product (after licensing). We
find that licensing is preferred only if the competitor is significantly weaker
(stronger) if the innovator is stronger (weaker) after licensing. This, combined
with the fact that licensing is more valuable when network effects are stronger,
highlights the importance of the tradeoff between greater competition and the
establishment of a stronger network.
Our research makes several contributions to theory and practice. First,
to our knowledge, this is the first work to consider the interactions of an in-
novator with a stronger rival. This is especially significant in environments
where important inventions are often driven by firms that do not necessarily
have the infrastructure to develop new products from these inventions. Second,
we develop a concise framework for categorizing and understanding commer-
cialization decisions, which takes into account the different factors that affect
ex post market outcomes. Managers of innovative firms in networked environ-
ments may find this framework valuable in considering the capability of their
rivals before making a technology sharing decision.
Although the stylization of our model allow us to explore the central
questions in depth, several assumptions and their impact on our findings need
to be acknowledged. First, analogous to literature (Conner, 1995; Sun et al.,
2004), we ignore the differences in consumers’ willingness to pay for network
effects. This limits the applicability of our model to certain product cate-
gories such as communication devices and document management systems. A
slightly different model may be required to consider products like video-game
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consoles, where not all gamers are equally avid fans of multi-player games.
Another limitation of our model is that we focus on purely vertically differen-
tiated products. While a different model that focuses on products differenti-
ated on horizontal attributes may yield different results, we believe that the
central tradeoff between network effects and competition will continue to be
important.
We do not model or consider the state of the industry before the in-
novation arrives. However, our analysis (in particular, § 3.5) indicates that
some innovations may not be worth pursuing in the first place. A potential
extension of this work could build on our analysis and develop a framework
for evaluating candidate technologies before development by considering ex
post commercialization decisions. While we do not consider the possibility
of co-developing the component technology, it is common for two seekers of
a solution to pool resources towards a mutually benefiting innovation. Fi-
nally, while we assume that each firm offers only one product, firms that cater
to markets with network effects may offer multiple variants of a product to
broaden their network base. Investigating these issues will serve to expand our
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Collaborating with Competitors in New Product
Development
4.1. Introduction
Collaboration among firms have proliferated in various industries such
as electronics, manufacturing and pharmaceutical since the early 1980s. How-
ever, at the same time competition in these industries has become stiffer than
ever before. Why is this occurring? Because, first, innovations require more
in-depth understanding of current technology and firms are becoming increas-
ingly specialized in certain technologies. Second, they are inextricably linked
by a mutual drive for success, a common direction of the future technology and
the need for continuous improvement. Therefore, they are seeking ways of uti-
lizing their know-how and expertise with external partners to gain a position
that will lead to superior performance and earnings, though these partnering
firms may be competitors in the market (Hamel et al., 1989). In this chapter
we examine how the essence of this new interaction between competitors lies
in the way collaboration and competition interact.
A good example to the interaction of collaboration and competition
comes from the tire industry. In the recent years the tire industry has been
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witnessing an alliance between the world’s two big tire developers and manufac-
turers, Michelin and Goodyear, to develop a run-flat tire technology, which has
attracted the close attention of big tire manufacturers for a past few decades1.
The run-flat tire is aimed to keep drivers safe from the dangers of a blowout
and changing a tire on the road; and lessen the hassles and delays of a flat
tire. Michelin has worked on its run-flat tire technology named PAX System
that allows the driver to drive at a speed up to 50 miles per hour for 100-150
miles after the tire gets punctured. Although Michelin’s achievements in the
technological developments related to PAX System has increased the antic-
ipation of PAX System to be the next biggest technological achievement in
the tire industry, Michelin has agreed to collaborate with a major competi-
tor, Goodyear, to codevelop the run-flat tire technology, but commercialize it
competitively (BusinessWeek, 2004).
As long as the benefits of a strategic alliance between firms outweigh
its risks such as revelation of technical information and competitive compro-
mise, collaboration with competitors could be beneficial for various reasons:
to have market dominance, to benefit from risk reduction (Kogut, 1991) or to
exploit each other’s resources (Pfeffer and Novak, 1976; Das and Teng, 2000).
In particular, the codevelopment between Michelin and Goodyear in our ex-
ample is related to the following similar reasons: First, Goodyear’s knowledge
and expertise in run-flat tire technology helped Michelin to reduce the devel-
opment risks and allocate its resources more efficiently. In the PAX System,
1http://www.goodyear.com/media/pr/nat_2000/22076ms.html
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Goodyear’s pressure monitoring system is used to monitor the air pressure
of the tire. The development of a sophisticated monitoring system would not
only have increased Michelin’s R&D expenses, but would have also delayed the
product’s market entry. Secondly, the alliance formation between Michelin and
Goodyear could mitigate the potential opportunistic behavior by giving the
car manufacturers and the consumers a second source to provide components
from an alternative source (Farrell and Gallini, 1988). And finally, a larger
aftermarket service network would increase the appeal to this new technolog-
ical product and thereby, to the cars with PAX System (Cohen and Whang,
1997).
However, the purpose and the benefits of a strategic alliance are not
limited to these reasons. An alliance can impact the nature of the supply
chain, the vertical relationships in the supply chain, and the decisions of chan-
nel members. In our example, the collaboration in codevelopment and the
competition in the marketing of the run-flat tire have enhanced the credibility
and adoption of the technology by the car manufacturers. The manufacturers
increased their investment in accommodating the tire in their cars and en-
hancing the consumer demand for cars with PAX System because with the
Michelin-Goodyear alliance, the codevelopment would provide them a better
technology, and moreover, the marketing competition would dampen the tire
prices. Nonetheless, this raises an issue for the alliance partners that the al-
liance partnership should not lead to competitive surrender in order to increase
the appeal of the manufacturers. Therefore, firms need to not only consider
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the role of the characteristics of the alliance on the decisions of the adopters,
but also privileges of the alliance partners.
Consequently, the manner in which the customer firm adopts a compo-
nent technology depends not only on the value of the innovation, but also on
the dynamics of the source. For example, as a response to the growing secu-
rity concerns of the electronic device manufacturers, a large group of hardware
and software companies, including Advanced Micro Devices, Hewlett-Packard,
IBM, Intel and Microsoft, have formed a security alliance named Trusted Com-
puting Group (TCG) to place hardware-based security technology into a host
of consumer and corporate devices. The goal of the TCG is to market security
hardware and software technology that will be integrated into various comput-
ing platforms, from PCs to mobile phones, by the electronic device manufac-
turers. Thus, the alliance has increased the appeal to the TCG-compliant func-
tionality and induced the manufacturers to manufacture their products using
components with TCG’s technology. Among the many forthcoming technolo-
gies are Phoenix Technologies’ Core Managed Environment and Transmeta’s
Cruose chip (CNETNews, 2003).
Motivated by these examples, the purpose of this research is to develop
a better understanding of the impact of the alliance formation on the nature
of the supply chain. We study how the structure and the investment decisions
of one level of the supply chain affect other dimensions of channel operations.
We are specifically interested in the strategic consequences of collaboration
and competition that the alliance between two upstream suppliers can impose
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upon a downstream original equipment manufacturer (OEM). We explore the
tradeoff between the reduced profits of the suppliers due to competition and
the demand increase due to investment decisions of the OEM.
In this chapter, our goal is to answer the main research questions: What
is the optimal alliance formation for the suppliers? How does the attractiveness
of an alliance play a role in affecting the OEM’s decision to invest in the
demand stimulating activities? Under what conditions is it more valuable
for the suppliers to compete rather than collaborate? To investigate these
questions, we first consider a situation in which suppliers would form a new
organization to develop and market the component. We next consider how
the outcome for the OEM and suppliers would change if they codevelop the
component, but compete in marketing and sales to the OEM. And finally,
we look into the situation where the suppliers may choose not to form any
alliance, and compete to develop and market the component independently.
In all of these situations we study the tradeoff between the reduced profits due
to competition and the demand increase due to investment decisions of the
OEM.
The modeling framework developed in this chapter extends prior re-
search by exploring the impact of a merger in the upstream supply chain upon
a downstream member. We consider several important parameters, including
the OEM’s investment in cost reduction, the extent to which the suppliers can
stimulate OEM’s investment through the type of formation, and the probabil-
ity of development success that the suppliers can have. Based on our analysis
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we identify the conditions under which it is beneficial for the suppliers to code-
velop and compete in sales. We show that although competition between the
suppliers would reduce their earnings from the component sales, it can also
help to induce the OEM to increase the investment amount. Therefore, the
relative attractiveness of different supplier formations depend on the increase
in consumer demand due to stimulating OEM’s investment. This explains
the counter-intuitive behavior of innovators with radical breakthroughs, who
willingly create competition.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2
we review the literature. Section 4.3 details our model. In Section 4.4, we
first analyze the impact of each supplier formation on the OEM’s investment
decisions. We then compare the profits of the members of the supply chain
and demonstrate the optimal formation for the suppliers and the OEM. The
final section concludes the chapter.
4.2. Literature Review
Our research is closely related to two main streams of literature: strate-
gic alliances and investments in cost reduction that might enhance demand.
The study of strategic alliances has been a subject of longstanding in-
terest in the literature. The literature has dealt in depth with the reasons and
consequences of strategic alliance making process in terms of risk sharing and
reducing investment costs (Kogut, 1991), increasing purchasing power (Gra-
not and Sosic, 2005), acquiring interfirm knowledge (Rosenkopf and Almeida,
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2003) and managing the uncertainty of resources (Pfeffer and Novak, 1976; Das
and Teng, 1998, 2000). A compilation of different perspectives of strategic al-
liances such as economic, real options, learning and relational can be found in
Reuer (2004). However, the alliance would evidently change the dynamics of
the market. Therefore, the alliance members have to evaluate their decisions in
joining an alliance (Granot and Sosic, 2005) and find coordination mechanisms
to align their individual-alliance member incentives (Nault and Tyagi, 2001).
(Kalaignanam et al., 2007) examine the partnership between asymmetric new
product development alliances and find that there are considerable asymme-
tries between the larger and smaller firms with regard to the effects of alliance,
partner, and firm characteristics on the gains of the partner firms. Similarly,
a merger could affect the profits of other participating and non-participating
firms (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; Braid, 1999; Brito, 2003). Our scope
is to further explore the impact of a strategic alliance and a merger on the
profits and decisions of the participants.
Within the literature on strategic alliances and mergers, our work is
closely relevant to Gilbert et al. (2007), who explore whether downstream
dealers should merge or remain separate when both the manufacturer and
the dealers can make investments to enhance demand. They consider how a
merger between two naturally differentiated dealers affects their interaction
with a common supplier, and find that the attractiveness of merging depends
upon the extent to which end demand can be stimulated by either an upstream
supplier or the dealers. Although we also consider the strategic effects of a
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merger, we consider a merger between two upstream suppliers in their interac-
tion with a downstream OEM, instead of the merger between two rival firms
that share a common upstream supplier. And we extend our discussion on the
attractiveness of an alliance to different supplier formations such as develop-
ment alliances. Our work is also related closely to Amaldoss and Rapoport
(2005) who study how the structure of competition affects the resources com-
mitted by alliance partners to product and market development. They find
that individual development increases investments in market but decreases in-
vestments in product development. However, we consider how the structure of
competition created by an alliance or a joint venture can play a role to create
incentives for the downstream OEM to invest in demand stimulating activities.
The development alliance and independent development in our frame-
work suggest a second source to downstream OEM. Therefore, this work also
contributes to the literature on second sourcing. There are various uses of
second sourcing. Firms can use second sourcing as a commitment not to act
opportunistically when a monopolist firm is unable to commit to long-term
contracts (Farrell and Gallini, 1988; Klotz and Chatterjee, 1995). In a net-
worked environment the entry of a second source can enlarge the user base
and increase the network benefits (Conner, 1995). A buyer can use a second
entrant supplier to provide information about the incumbent’s costs (Demski
et al., 1987). Nonetheless, second sourcing may result in strictly less expected
profits (Riordan and Sappington, 1989). To manage the potential gains from
a second production source, firms have to evaluate the supply chain dynamics
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with the presence of a second source. In this chapter we examine the affect
of a second source on the tradeoff between increased competition and higher
downstream investment to analyze the suppliers’ decision of alliance formation.
Because we focus on the impact of a formation on the investment in cost
reduction by a downstream OEM to increase demand, our work is also related
to the literature on investment in cost reduction. Cost reducing investments
play different roles in supply chains. Gupta and Loulou (1998) consider process
innovation which can reduce the unit production costs of two manufacturers
with differentiated products. They show that manufacturers invest less in
cost reduction when the differentiation between the products is low, but they
still benefit from independent retailers. Gilbert and Cvsa (2003) show that a
manufacturer can stimulate cost reducing or demand enhancing investments
from its downstream channel partners by using a ceiling price contract in a
supply chain that faces considerable demand uncertainty. Gilbert et al. (2006)
consider a situation in which two OEMs compete both in terms of investments
in cost reduction and in terms of the prices that they set for their products.
They explore the role that an external supplier(s) can play in dampening cost
competition between the OEMs when there are opportunities to invest in cost
reduction. We also look at how the cost reducing investment decision at one
level of the supply chain affects other levels of the channel.
In this chapter we specifically consider a situation in which two up-
stream suppliers collaborate to stimulate the OEM’s investments in cost re-
duction and the product prices. Thus, we contribute to the literature on
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strategic alliances by studying the impact of alliances on a firm’s choice of
investment and analyzing the optimal supplier formation. Throughout the
chapter, we adopt the convention of using feminine pronouns to refer to the
suppliers and masculine pronoun for the OEM.
4.3. Model
We consider a supply chain in which two suppliers are developing a
breakthrough component that would be used in the final product of a down-
stream OEM. We assume that both suppliers could successfully develop the
component with an exogenous probability of P . This is a valid assumption in
our framework because each firm may have the expertise and the resources re-
quired for a technological breakthrough. For example, Michelin and Goodyear
have been working to commercialize the run-flat tire technology since early
1980s and have displayed their competence and potential to succeed through
patents they have acquired on this and related technologies. The OEM could
procure this breakthrough component only from these suppliers. The suppliers
are identical, so if both suppliers are successful, he procures in equal quantities
from each supplier. Further, the suppliers do not offer a substitute component
that could replace the value of this component. Therefore, if a supplier fails,
she will not sell a substitute component and make zero profits. And if both
suppliers fail, no profits are made by any of the firms.
We let s be the amount of the component quality which the suppliers
may develop and we normalize the quality of the product without the compo-
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nent to one. Hence, the new product with the component has a total quality
of 1+s. Each consumer either purchases a product with the new technological
component, or can buy no product since the product does not perform without
this component. Their valuation for product quality is uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, 1]. We denote a consumer with valuation v as a consumer of
type v. A product with new component provides an intrinsic value of v (1 + s)
for a consumer of type v. Therefore, the utility for a product of quality s is
given by
U (v, s) = vs (4.1)
A consumer of type v has a total valuation of v (1 + s) if he purchases a
product.
Based on the model of consumer valuation in (4.1), let vc represent the
valuation of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying a new
product with the breakthrough technology and and nothing. All consumers
with valuations in [vc, 1] purchase a new product from the manufacturer. Con-
sumers with valuations in [0, vc) purchase nothing. The marginal consumer
with valuations at v can obtain the same payoff from purchasing a product
and nothing, and would have the following incentive compatibility constraint,
respectively,
vc (1 + s)− p = 0 (4.2)
where p denotes the price of the product sold by the OEM. Since the OEM
produces a quantity q of product, the marginal consumer of type vc, who is
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indifferent between buying a product and nothing, will have a valuation of
1− q, i.e. vc = 1− q. Writing the valuation in (4.2) in terms of quantities, we
can find the price function of quantities as
p (q) = (1 + s) (1− q) (4.3)
We assume that the OEM’s marginal cost of production c is constant,
constant, and for ease of exposition we normalize the supplier’s marginal pro-
duction cost to zero. Although the assumption of constant production cost
is simple, this is a reasonable assumption since, in practice, there could be
production costs that are constant in the volume of production for a range
of output and a new component technology may be integrated in the OEM’s
current production process without any additional costs.
We consider that the OEM could invest an amount of r in cost reduction
to enhance demand in anticipation of successful development. Hence, the OEM
would choose the product quantity to maximize his profit function
πOEM (q, r) = q (p (q)− w − (c− r)) (4.4)
where w is the supplier wholesale price. The suppliers are capacity constrained,
so the wholesale price they could charge is the maximum price at which the
OEM will accept the entire quantity offered by the suppliers. And the supplier
i maximizes her profits
πiS (q, r) = qiwi (q, r) (4.5)
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by determining the wholesale price for the optimal quantity demanded by the
OEM.
The OEM also incur some fixed investment costs. We assume that
the OEM could invest the following amount to achieve the production cost
reduction of r:
Ir (r) = Kr
2 (4.6)
where K is a parameter that determines how costly it is to stimulate the
reduction in the production cost. The parameter K determines the relative
ease with which investments can be stimulated by cost reduction. Note that
the investment function is increasing and convex, reflecting that the level of
cost reduction increases investment costs as the OEMs aim to influence a
greater cost reduction. For optimal cost reduction to be positive and feasible
in each formation, we assume that K > K = P (2−P )
9(1+s)
, which is decreasing in
the component quality s and increasing in the probability of success P .
We consider that the interactions between the suppliers and the OEM
occur as follows: In the first stage, the suppliers either decide on a collaborative
formation, a development alliance or a joint venture, or have no collaborative
structure to first develop and then market the component. In the joint venture
(JV) suppliers form a monopoly in order to collaborate for the development
and marketing of the component. In the development alliance (DA), they
codevelop the component, but upon successful development, they compete in
marketing of the component. And in independent development (ID), suppliers
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do not form any kind of collaborative structure in development and marketing
and compete with each other in development and marketing.
Subsequently, in the second stage the OEM makes a cost reducing in-
vestment without observing the outcome of the technology development, but
he is fully informed about the type of the supplier formation. The third stage
is concerned with the product quantity decision of the suppliers and the OEM.
Each supplier decides on a fixed component production capacity and offers a
wholesale price w. The OEM then sells this quantity at the consumer market.
In the last two stages, the suppliers play a simultaneous non-cooperative game
with complete information.
In the analysis to follow, first we look at the optimal decisions of the
firms under a monopoly and a duopoly supplier, and characterize the profits of
each firm. Subsequently, we consider the expected profits under each supplier
formation. Our method of analysis will be to first assume that the suppliers
have chosen one of the formations and examine the suppliers’ and OEM’s
decisions in the subsequent stages. We look at each formation more closely and
and examine how the choice of supplier formation interacts with the OEM’s
investments.
4.4. Analysis
First let us evaluate the profits for the suppliers and the OEM under
a monopoly supplier and a duopoly supplier. Depending on their decision of
supplier formation, the suppliers would result in a monopoly or a duopoly.
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Solving the manufacturer’s profit function in (4.4) with the price function in




The suppliers would determine the wholesale price which is determined by
their capacity. Since the OEM will accept the entire quantity and the suppliers
would not overproduce, the supplier’s wholesale price becomes
w (q, r) = 1 + s− 2 (1 + s) q − c + r (4.8)
Now we turn to the profits of the suppliers in a monopoly and a duopoly
supplier market. In the monopoly supplier market, the supplier maximizes her
profit function π1 (q, r) = qw (q, r) by determining the wholesale price for the
optimal quantity of the OEMs in (4.7),
w∗1S =
s− c + r
2
(4.9)
Hence, we can find the profits for a single supplier and the OEM, respectively,
as
π1S (r) =







(s− c + r)2
16s
(4.11)
Similarly, in the duopoly supplier market, the suppliers, say supplier 1
and supplier 2, maximize their profits, π1 (q1, r) = q1w (q, r) and π2 (q1, r) =
q2w (q, r) simultaneously where q1 and q2 are the supplier 1’s and the supplier
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2’s quantities, respectively, with the overall new products as q = q1 + q2. We
can easily show that the suppliers would produce equal quantities, q∗1 = q∗2 and
we can find the optimal wholesale price in (4.8) as
w∗2S =
s− c + r
3
(4.12)
Consequently, the profits of each supplier in a duopoly and the OEM are,
respectively,
π2S (r) =







(s− c + r)2
9s
(4.14)
By comparing profit functions of the suppliers, (4.10) with (4.13), and
the OEM, (4.11) with (4.14), in a single and two-supplier markets, we can show
that the suppliers are better off in a monopoly while the OEM would make
higher profits sourcing from a duopoly for a given investment amount. How-
ever, the OEM’s decision on the cost reduction r could change the suppliers’
collaboration strategy.
4.4.1 Strategic Supplier Formations
Until now, we considered the profits for the suppliers and the OEM un-
der a single or a dual source. Next we incorporate the probability of supplier
success P into our model and find the optimal investment on the cost reduc-
tion by the OEM under each supplier formation: joint venture, development
alliance, and independent development. We discuss the merits and mechanics
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of each formation for the suppliers and the OEM.
Joint Venture
Mergers and joint ventures are a common practice among business ven-
tures. We assume that a joint venture would increase the potential market
power for the suppliers. In our model, the two suppliers that are interested in
developing the component technology combine their resources and know-how
to establish one venture that would develop the component and later market
it. Hence, the joint venture would have the following profit function
πJV (r) = P (2− P ) π1S (r) (4.15)
where π1S is computed in (4.10). Since the suppliers in our model are identical,
we split the profits of a joint venture equally between the two venture partners,
πJV 1 = πJV 2 =
πJV
2
. Further, the OEM would maximize the following profit
function by investing r
πOEMJV (r) = P (2− P ) πOEM1S (r)− Ir (r) (4.16)
where we have computed πOEM1S in (4.11). Maximizing the profit function in
(4.16), we can find the optimal cost reduction that the OEM would apply as
r∗JV =
P (2− P ) (1 + s− c)




Under the formation of a development alliance in our model, the sup-
pliers codevelop the component technology. However, each supplier set her
capacity and use her own marketing resources. In this formation, supplier i’s
profit function is
πDAi (r) = P (2− P ) π2S (r) (4.18)
and the OEM’s expected profit function becomes
πOEMDA (r) = P (2− P ) πOEM2S (r)− Ir (r) (4.19)
Similar to the JV case, we maximize the OEM’s profits in (4.19) and find the
optimal amount of cost reduction that the OEM would apply
r∗DA =
P (2− P ) (1 + s− c)
9K (1 + s)− P (2− P )
(4.20)
Independent Development
And finally, we consider the case where suppliers choose not to collabo-
rate at the development and marketing stages. If both suppliers are successful,
the supplier market becomes a duopoly. Further, one successful supplier could
act as a monopolist and charges monopoly price to maximize her profit if the
rival supplier fails. Therefore, the expected profit function of supplier i is
πIDi (r) = P
2π2S (r) + P (1− P ) π1S (r) (4.21)
and the OEM’s expected profit function is
πOEMID (r) = P
2πOEM2S (r) + 2P (1− P ) πOEM1S (r)− Ir (r) (4.22)
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Maximizing (4.22) with respect to r, the optimal amount of cost reduction is
r∗ID =
P (9− P ) (1 + s− c)
72K (1 + s)− P (9− P )
(4.23)
The OEM’s optimal investment amount r in each formation depends
on his cost reduction parameter K, the probability of the supplier success, P ,
and the quality of the component, s. The OEM makes a larger investment
when the suppliers are more likely to develop the component or could offer
a higher quality. Also, if the OEM does not incur a very high production or
investment cost, he will also invest a larger amount.
4.4.2 Equilibria Analysis for Supplier Formations
Now we can explore the optimal decisions of the OEM and the suppliers
among all formations. Comparing the potential profits that the OEM could
generate under each formation, we obtain the OEM’s optimal decision.
Proposition 4.4.1. Optimal Investment in Cost Reduction by OEM
For all values of P , s, and c, among the supplier formations (joint venture,
development alliance and independent development),
i) The OEM’s equilibrium investment in cost reduction is the largest in a de-
velopment alliance.
ii) Further, the OEM’s equilibrium profit is the largest in a development al-
liance.
The proof of Proposition 4.4.1 is straightforward by comparing the op-
timal cost reduction and the profit of the OEM under each formation. Propo-
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sition 4.4.1 shows how much the OEM invests with respect to each supplier
formation. The OEM invests the largest amount in formations where he can
obtain the highest profits from the suppliers; and therefore, the investments
in formations where the OEM can use a dual source are higher. In a devel-
opment alliance, successful development of the technology certainly leads to a
duopoly in the market. Duopoly is less likely if the suppliers were developing
independently; and would simply not exist in a joint venture. The competition
between the suppliers increase the investment amount that the OEM would
make in a DA. The total capacity also increases as the OEM invests more in
the cost reduction. Further, under ID formation, the OEM would always keep
his investment amount less than he would in a DA, but more than he would
in a JV. The DA formation is a commitment to a dual source, which induces
the OEM to invest larger.
Consequently, we compare the suppliers’ profits across each formation
and find conditions under which joint venture, development alliance and in-
dependent development are optimal. First, we start with collaborative for-
mations, JV and DA. Proposition 4.4.2 summarizes the suppliers’ decisions
between the collaborative development environments.
Proposition 4.4.2. Suppliers’ Decisions to Collaborate





such that when K < K, the suppliers would
make more profits in a development alliance than in a joint venture. Otherwise,
the suppliers would be better off in a joint venture than in a development
alliance.
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The proof of this proposition is straightforward by comparing profits
in DA and JV. The main tradeoff that the suppliers face is the additional
profits that they could make as a monopoly to higher downstream investment
in cost reduction by OEM. Proposition 4.4.2 displays how the suppliers eval-
uate this tradeoff and decide on a formation between the two collaborative
supplier formations, DA and JV. We can show that the higher the probability
of successful technology development is (high P ), the more the suppliers are
interested in a DA. When the technology is not very hard to develop for the
suppliers, the OEM is more inclined to invest anticipating that the suppliers
could develop this component successfully. Further, the OEM is more willing
to invest when he can source from two suppliers since the competition would
reduce the wholesale price. However, as it becomes harder for suppliers to
develop (P decreases), the OEM would reduce his investment amount (r is
decreasing in P ). Then the OEM’s investment becomes less of a contribution
to overall supplier profits. Hence, for technologies harder to develop (low P ),
the suppliers could make more profits as a monopoly in a JV.
Proposition 4.4.2 also demonstrates that the OEM’s cost structure in-
fluences his investment decision and the supplier formation. The suppliers are
better off when they market separately in a DA if the OEM can afford to suf-
ficiently reduce the cost through his investments without incurring high costs(
K < K
)




, the OEM would also
invest less and the suppliers would be better off in a JV charging the monopoly
wholesale price. Therefore, analogous to our finding for the OEM in Propo-
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sition 4.4.1, Proposition 4.4.2 shows that so long as the investment costs are
not excessive, the suppliers who market separately and create competition can
also make higher profits by inducing the OEM’s investment strategy.
It is also of interest to note that the threshold, K, is decreasing in s,
the magnitude of the quality improvement due to new component. When this
improvement is large, the suppliers require the OEM to have more and more
attractive cost reduction opportunities in order to justify using a DA instead of
a JV. And the OEM is more willing to procure from a monopoly supplier and
pay a higher wholesale price since he will receive a higher quality component
in return.
In addition, Proposition 4.4.2 also explains the special case in which
the OEM has no ability to influence the demand through cost reduction when
the new component technology requires very high investment for any amount





the OEM cannot stimulate the demand through cost reduction, the suppliers
are not concerned about forming a development alliance to increase the OEM’s
incentives to invest. Therefore, it is never beneficial for the suppliers to create
marketing competition.
Further, the suppliers may choose not to participate in any of the for-
mations and develop independently. Next we look into how their decision
changes if they also have this option.
Proposition 4.4.3. Independent Development
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such that when KLB < K < KUB, the suppliers would not participate in any
form of alliance and develop independently.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4.4.3 extends the discussion of Proposition 4.4.2 and ex-
plains how the suppliers would decide on a collaborative formation or reject
both for different values of P and K. In addition to DA and JV, the ID repre-
sents a formation in which the tradeoff between increased OEM’s investment
and decreased monopoly benefits play a decisive factor for the suppliers, but
does not dominate for neither structure. If the suppliers do not form any al-
liance or joint venture, the individual efforts of each supplier may result in a
monopoly or a duopoly. On one hand, the OEM will not reduce his investment
amount as low as he would have in a JV. On the other hand, he will not invest
as high as in a DA. From the suppliers’ perspective, one supplier may become
a monopoly, but also she will receive a higher downstream investment than if
she were a single supplier. Hence, independent development could become the
optimal supplier formation.
Figure 4.1 illustrates our results in an example. When the suppliers
are very likely to develop the technology and the OEM does not incur high
costs, the suppliers could compensate the reduction in their profits by forming
a duopoly with the OEM’s investment. This interaction is observed in the
region “DA”. However, if it gets costly and the suppliers may fail, the OEM
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would lessen its optimal investment amount. Therefore, the suppliers are less
inclined to give up their monopoly profits, as shown in region “JV” in our
example. When each of these formations cannot dominate, we observe the
region “ID” between “DA” and “JV”, where a monopoly or a duopoly supplier
is possible.
Figure 4.1: Optimal Supplier Formations, s = 0.8 and c = 0.2.
4.5. Conclusions
Strategic alliances could be very beneficial for participants for various
operational and financial reasons. Nevertheless, the partnering firms have to
consider the impact of their alliance on the supply chain dynamics. Since
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the non-participants alter their decisions relative to the characteristics of the
formation, the alliance formation decision has a significant impact on the prof-
itability of all supply chain members. In this chapter, we consider the optimal
alliance formation decision faced by two suppliers, who may choose to collab-
orate in the development and marketing stages or compete in only marketing
stage or both stages. Whereas several situational factors determine the spe-
cific way in which they might decide on the alliance formation, we particularly
focus on the OEM’s investment in cost reduction, the extent to which the
OEM can stimulate demand through its investments, and the probability of
development success that the suppliers can have.
In this chapter, we study the conditions of this critical decision by
paying attention to the suppliers who exploits the OEM’s investment decision
in cost reduction by choosing an alliance to compete in sales. Our findings
suggest that while the decision to compete in marketing reduces the supplier
profits, the increase in the OEM’s investment stimulates consumer demand
for the product with the component and thereby, some additional profits for
suppliers. We show that a central consideration in the suppliers’ decision on the
type of supplier formation, joint venture, development alliance or independent
development, is the positive value generated by the OEM’s investment.
We present a framework for the supplier formation depending on the
parameter values. The likelihood of development alliance formation is greater
if the OEM has a more efficient production process, i.e. the OEM could incur
lower investment costs or if the suppliers are very likely to develop the technol-
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ogy. The fact that joint venture is not always a profitable alternative depends
on the positive value that the OEM can generate. The optimal formation
strategies are characterized by thresholds on the investment parameter of the
OEM.
Our research makes several contributions to theory and practice. First,
our research identifies the effect of alliance formation on the decisions of the
supply chain members. This is especially significant in a competitive market
where firms need to exploit each other’s resources for continuous development,
but they have to consider the effects on the non-participants. Second, the
suppliers could obtain the highest profits with a monopoly, so it is expected for
them to form a joint venture to have market dominance. On the contrary, our
findings show that they could actually improve their profits with a development
alliance. Third, we develop a simple analytical framework for understanding
formation decisions, which takes into account the different factors that affect
post-alliance market structure. Managers of innovative firms may find this
framework valuable in considering the impact of an alliance before making a
formation decision.
Although we have made some stylized assumptions in our model to
study the central question, we acknowledge several assumptions and their in-
fluence on our findings, and discuss how we can extend our work. First, we only
consider two identical suppliers. This limits the applicability of our model to
other alliance formations. Also, the suppliers in our model create no synergy in
any alliance formation. Even though our results highlight a counter-intuitive
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interaction between firms, the operational synergy and compatibility between
suppliers could extend managers’ understanding of supplier interactions on the
operational level.
Another limitation of our model is that we focus on a model with
complete information. However, most OEMs are not well informed about the
technological progress and may not best assess the likelihood of a successful
development. In addition, the suppliers may not appraise the rival’s likelihood
of success. A different model that allows the information asymmetry between
the suppliers or between the OEM and the suppliers could alter the suppliers’
formation and OEM’s investment decisions, and hence, yield different results.




Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
In this dissertation, we look into how competition and collaboration
in a value chain impact the development and deployment of a product or an
innovation. We present analytical models that examine strategic issues related
to product design, product development and technology development and de-
ployment and identify how competitive and collaborative forces in a supply
chain influence a firm’s decisions. Based on our analysis of each model in this
dissertation we find that it is essential for firms to evaluate the inter-firm in-
teractions to thrive in the marketplace. As the relationships between firms in
a supply chain become increasingly interactive, the growing interdependence
between firms may require strategic collaboration. Managing this interaction
effectively, firms could benefit from the challenges associated with their in-
teractions with supply chain partners and competitors. Consequently, they
should be able to recognize the business tradeoffs and implement the appro-
priate methodologies that can exploit the strategic interactions in the value
chain.
This dissertation analyzes the collaborative and competitive issues in
specific contexts of technology and product development and deployment. In
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chapter 2, we provide one explanation why some firms in multiple industries
of of a durable good and a contingent consumable design their durable good
compatible with generic consumables of competitors. This research highlights
the relation between the inter-firm interactions and how a firm’s product pro-
vides value to consumers. We show under which conditions the consumers’
willingness to pay for a durable good increases when there are more affordable
consumables available. Chapter 3 extends the discussion on the inter-firm in-
teractions by considering the commercialization of a component innovation in
a network economy. We provide insights on why some firms are more will-
ing to share their component technology while others choose to commercialize
it individually. We show that competitors whose capability to develop other
components for the product and integrate it with the component technology
are significantly different from their own abilities could enable firms to ob-
tain greater profits and market coverage. Finally, in chapter 4, we explore
situations in which firms collaborate to develop a component innovation, but
market individually; they codevelop and jointly market; and they choose to
individually develop and market. We show how competitive strategies between
development partners should consider the influence of the supplier formation
on the investment incentives of an OEM. First, we identify the conditions for
the suppliers who exploit the OEM’s investment decision in cost reduction by
choosing an alliance to compete in sales. Next we find that while the decision
to compete in marketing lessens the supplier profits, the increase in the OEM’s
investment causes a surge in consumer demand and thereby, some additional
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profits for suppliers.
The analysis in this research and the models used to derive them can
be extended and improved in several ways to enhance our understanding of
collaboration and competition in a value chain. Richer models that include
competition among the members of the same level in the supply chain could
provide valuable and more realistic discoveries and extend the realm of this
research framework to additional industries. Another challenging extension
of these results would come from considering information asymmetry between
firms. Though this is not an easy task, such an analysis would greatly im-
prove our understanding of how firms should implement collaborative and
competitive strategies when there are higher risks involved in their decisions
due to lack of information. Studying operational issues like capacity planning,
procurement, and supply chain contracts represent another avenue for future
research to link the research insights to applicability. These extensions would
broaden diverse aspects of the managerial issues faced by organizations in a
variety of industries. In conclusion, while this dissertation provides a better
understanding of strategic issues in collaboration and competition in supply





Managing Revenue Streams for Durable
Products with Contingent Services or
Consumable Components
A.1. Construction of the Steady State Solution
We want to show that there exist initial states that follow the manufac-
turer’s quantity decisions and converge to the focal point at the steady state.
To illustrate this approach, we use backward induction. The initial condition
in our problem is the situation where the manufacturer offers all new product
bundles, so a1 (v) = {N} for all consumers of type v.
Assume, without loss of generality, that the focal point is reached at






, which are defined in (2.26) and
(2.27), respectively.1 Since we know that all durable goods in period 2 are used
by the consumers who also buy a branded or generic consumable in period 3,
the number of consumers who buy a new product or a branded consumable in
period 2 is the same as the number of consumers with the same preferences
at the steady state, i.e. q2∗ = qt∗ for t ≥ 3. The Bellman equation for the
1This assumption is common in the literature with similar methodology Huang et al.
(2001); Ferrer and Swaminathan (2006)
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and hence, M2 (q2) has the same maximum value as the profits at the focal
point.
The Bellman equation for a consumer of type v at period 2 is
D2v
(











a2 (v) , qFOC
)}
(A.1)
The optimal solution to (A.1), a2 (v), has to satisfy the result of the subsequent
period, i.e. q3∗ = qFOC . Thus, since the quantities at period 2 are the steady
state quantities and a2 (v) is a function of a1 (v), Equation (A.1) specifies a1 (v)
such that it would meet the condition at the steady state, i.e. q2∗ = q3∗.
















where there are initially no consumables, i.e. q1B = 0. The manufacturer
only maximizes his profits on the quantity of new product bundles, but his
production quantity must be consistent with the consumer behavior at period














a1 (v) , q1
)}
Backtracking the equilibrium path, we find a threshold condition such
that there would be no excess used durable goods, p2u > 0, or that some excess
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amount of used durable goods, p2u = 0, in period 2. Using backward induction,





− 1− cd − (1 + δ) (pG − sd2sG)− sd2
2− sd2 (2− 4 (1 + δ) sG)
.


















Consequently, the production quantity of the first period influences the
consumer behaviors and market structure in period 2 as well as in period 1,
but the steady state is established after period 2.
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Appendix B
Commercializing Component Innovations: The
Roles of Firm Capabilities and Network Effects
B.1. Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 (α < 1)
While we restrict ourselves to θ ≤ 8/9 in the paper, most of our results
can be extended to 8/9 < θ < 1 with minor modifications. We offer a more
general statement of Proposition 3.4.1 and a proof below.
Proposition B.1.1. Licensing to a Weaker rival in an Uncontested
Market for 0 < θ < 1
When the rival is weaker than the innovator (α < 1),
a) For each value of θ, there exist thresholds αwM and αwM such that the inno-
vator licenses its innovation to a weaker rival if αwM ≤ α ≤ αwM . For all other
values of α, the innovator prefers captive use.
b) The thresholds αwM is decreasing in K and αwM is increasing in K.
c) The thresholds αwM is increasing in θ and αwM is increasing in θ for small
values of K.
Proof. a) The innovator licenses when Fw + πwi (α) ≥ π∗m. Since Fw = πwc (α),
using (3.5) and (3.7), the technology is licensed if α ∈ [αwM , αwM ]. The li-












, where γ = 1+9θ−12K (8− 11θ + 3θ2).
Note that γ ≥ 0 only if K ≤ Kw = (1+9θ)
12(8−11θ+3θ2) .












≥ 0 for small values of K.









B.2. Proof of Corollary 3.4.2 (α < 1)




5−4θ . Adapting the results
in Conner (1995), we obtain ᾱ = θ. It is easy to establish that 0 ≤ ᾱ ≤ αwM .
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 (α > 1)
The results are summarized in Table B.1.
Commercialization Rival’s Development Cost
Strategy K < Ks K ≥ Ks
Captive Use 1 ≤ α ≤ αcsM 1 ≤ α ≤ αlcM
Sell Out αcsM < α ≤ αslM -
Licensing αslM < α αlcM < α
Table B.1: Commercialization Strategy in an Uncontested Market with a
Strong Rival
Proof. Let F sS (α) and F sL (α) be the fees charged by the innovator when the
technology is sold out (to the rival) and licensed (to the rival) respectively.
Since the market is uncontested, F sS (α) = π∗cm (α) and F sL (α) = πsc (α), where
π∗cm (α) and πsc (α) represent the rival’s profits under sell-out and licensing,
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respectively ((3.12) and (3.10)).
The innovator prefers to be acquired by her rival over captive use (C)
if F sS > π∗m, which occurs if α > αcsM . The innovator’s profit from licensing is
given by F sL (α)+πsi (α). There exists an αslM such that F sL (α)+πsi (α) ≤ F sS (α)
iff α ≤ αslM . Further, it can be shown that π∗m ≥ F sL (α)+πsi (α) when α ≤ αlcM .
Let Ks = 9/
(





First consider the K < Ks case. When K < Ks, 1 < αcsM < αslM . When
1 ≤ α < αcsM , F sS (α) ≤ π∗m and F sL (α) + πsi (α) ≤ π∗m; therefore, the innovator
prefers C. When αcsM ≤ α < αslM , F sS (α) ≥ π∗m and F sL (α) + πsi (α) ≤ F sS (α);
therefore, selling out is preferred. Finally, when α ≥ αslM , F sL (α) + πsi (α) ≥
F sS (α) ≥ π∗m; therefore, all innovations with α ≥ αslM are licensed.
The analysis is similar and straightforward for K ≥ Ks.
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3.5.1
Proof. Since the rival is weaker, and is not interested in technologies inferior
to its own, α0 < α < 1.
Compatible Innovation. If the technology is licensed, the licensing fee
is given by FwL (α; α0) = πwc (α) − πwc (α0), where πwc (.) is defined in (3.5).
Similarly, the buy out fee paid by the innovator is given by FwS = πwc (α0).
Since the innovator will license if FwL ≥ πwi (α), she will consider li-
censing iff α0 ≤ α ≤ αD (α0, θ). Similarly the rival will be bought out iff
α0 ≥ α0D (θ). Since αD (α0D (θ) , θ) ≤ α0D (θ), we can also conclude that both
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licensing and buying out are never simultaneously profitable for the innovator.
Proofs of parts (c) and (d) follow directly from the expressions above.
B.5. Proof of Proposition 3.5.2
Proof. We follow the structure defined in Proof of Proposition 3.5.1.
Incompatible Innovation. When the innovation is incompatible with the
rival’s existing product, any one of three cases may arise depending on the
strength of network effects: (i) If α0 ≤ α4 (θ) and θ ≤ .5, both firms stay and
compete in a duopoly; (ii) If α4 (θ) ≤ α0 ≤ 1 and θ ≤ .5, then the innovator is
a monopolist and sets pi = θ; (iii) If θ > .5, the innovator is a monopolist and
sets pi = 1/2, where α4 (θ) = 1− 3θ + 2θ2.
As above, by comparing FwL , FwS and πwi , πm, it is straightforward to show that
the innovation is licensed iff α ≤ αI (α0, θ) and sold out iff α0 ≥ α0I (θ), where
αI and α0I are defined in the technical supplement at the end of Chapter 3.
The rest of the Proposition is easy follows from the expressions.
B.6. Commercializing Persistently Incompatible Innova-
tions
Proposition B.6.1. Persistently Incompatible Innovation
a) If the rival is weaker (α0 < α < 1), the innovator always captively uses her
technology. Further, she buys out her rival iff 0 ≤ α0 ≤ α0I (θ).
b) If the rival is stronger (1 < α0 < α), the innovator always sells out her
technology to a stronger rival
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Proof. a) We defined in 3.5.1 when the innovator’s product is incompatible
with the rival’s product, we would have three cases depending on the strength
of the network effects: (i) If α0 ≤ α4 (θ) and θ < 8/9, both firms stay and
compete in a duopoly; (ii) If α4 (θ) ≤ α0 ≤ α5 (θ) and θ < 8/9, then the
innovator is a monopolist and sets pi = θ; (iii) If 8/9 > θ > .5, the innovator
is a monopolist and sets pi = 1/2, where α5 (θ) = (1− θ)2.
By comparing πwi and FwS , it is easy to show that the innovator use the inno-
vation captively and buys out the rival when 0 ≤ α0 ≤ α0I (θ).
b) Proof is similar to part (a).
B.7. Proof of Proposition 3.5.3
Proof. Since the rival is stronger, and is interested in technologies superior to
its own, α > α0 > 1.
Compatible Innovation. If the technology is licensed, the licensing fee
is given by F sL (α; α0) = πsc (α) − πsc (α0), where πwc (.) is defined in (3.5).
Similarly, the sell-out fee received by the innovator is given by F sS (α; α0) =
π∗m (α)− πsc (α0), where π∗m (α) is the monopolist profit received by rival with
product quality α.
It can be verified that F sL (α; α0) + πsi (α) ≥ πsi (α0) ∀ α > α0 > 1.
Therefore, the innovator never prefers captive use. Further, it can be shown
that F sL (α; α0) + πsi (α) ≥ F sS (α; α0) iff α ≥ αslM , where αslM is defined in the
Proof of Proposition 3.4.3. Further, if α0 ≥ αslM , it is clear that there is no
α (> α0) such that α < αslM . Therefore, selling out is never preferred.
129
Incompatible Innovation. First consider the case in which α0 ≥ αl0I (θ) ≥ 1,
where αl0I (θ) = 1/α4 (θ). It is easy to verify that αl0I (θ) ≥ 1 iff θ ≤ 0.5 and
that the innovator prefers to license all α > α0 when this is true. In all
other cases, by comparing F sL (α; α0)+πsi (α) and F sS (α; α0), we can show that
licensing is more profitable than selling out iff α ≥ αslM .
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Appendix C
Collaborating with Competitors in New Product
Development
C.0.1 Proof of Proposition 4.4.3





JV ) < πDAi (r
∗
DA); and when K ≥ K, 12πJV (r
∗
JV ) ≥ πDAi (r∗DA). Next
we compare the profits of a supplier in collaboration with the profits that she
would make in an independent development. For all values of the parameters,
0 < P < 1and s > c > 0, πDAi (r∗DA) > 0, πISi (r∗IS) > 0 and πJV (r∗JV ) > 0.
When K < K, πDAi (r∗DA) < πISi (r∗IS) for KLB < K < K . And similarly,
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